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Abstract 
More and more states have passed laws that allow individuals to use marijuana for medical 
purposes. There is an ongoing, heated policy debate over whether these laws have increased 
marijuana use among non-patients. In this paper, I address that question empirically by 
studying marijuana possession arrests in cities from 1988 to 2008. I estimate fixed effects 
models with city-specific time trends that can condition on unobserved heterogeneities across 
cities in both their levels and trends. I find that these laws increase marijuana arrests among 
adult males by about 15–20%. These results are further validated by findings from data on 
treatment admissions to rehabilitation facilities: marijuana treatments among adult males 
increased by 10–20% after the passage of medical marijuana laws.   
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“By characterizing the use of illegal drugs as quasi-legal, state-sanctioned, Saturday afternoon 
fun, legalizers destabilize the societal norm that drug use is dangerous…Children entering 
drug abuse treatment routinely report that they heard that ‘pot is medicine’ and, therefore, 
believed it to be good for them.” Andrea Barthwell, M.D., Former Deputy Director of the White 
House Office of National Drug Control Policy, in an editorial in The Chicago Tribune, 
February 17, 2004 
 
1. Introduction  
 Medical marijuana legislation represents a major change in U.S. policy toward 
marijuana in recent years. As of May 2014, 22 states and the District of Columbia had passed 
laws that allow individuals with designated symptoms to use marijuana for medical purposes. 
Two medical marijuana states, Colorado and Washington, went further to legalize the 
recreational use of marijuana in November 2012.  
Although the number of legal patients was relatively small until recently, it has been a 
popular belief among public media that legalization has increased illegal marijuana use among 
non-patients (Leger, 2012; O'Connor, 2011). Federal agencies such as the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) also oppose these laws based on this notion, and continue to list 
marijuana as a Schedule I drug with no accepted medical value (Drug Enforcement 
Administration, 2011). Some evidence suggests that the leaking of medical marijuana from 
legal patients or dispensaries may be common (Salomonsen-Sautel et al., 2012; Thurstone et 
al., 2011). Moreover, these laws could send a “wrong message” to the public and increase 
social acceptance for marijuana use. For example, Khatapoush and Hallfors (2004) find that 
people in California perceived less harm from smoking marijuana after legalization. 
Empirically, there is indeed a strong correlation among medical marijuana legislation, the 
perceived risk of marijuana, and marijuana use. Drawing on public-use state-level data from 
the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) for the years 2002 through 2008, Wall 
et al. (2011) find that legalization was associated with a higher prevalence rate and a lower 
perceived risk of marijuana use among juveniles. Cerdá et al. (2012) also find a similar 
correlation among adults from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related 
Conditions (NESARC).  
Despite the strong correlation, the causal link appears to be weak after accounting for 
existing state differences. Most of the existing studies focus on juveniles. Harper et al. (2012) 
show that the findings from Wall et al. (2011) are quite sensitive to the inclusion of state fixed 
effects. A couple of studies look at the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) 
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and do not find any change in juvenile marijuana usage (Choo et al., 2014; Lynne-Landsman 
et al., 2013; O'Keefe and Earleywine, 2011). Using a number of datasets that cover a longer 
period, including the YRBSS, Treatment Episode Data Sets (TEDS), and National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97), Anderson et al. (2012) also finds no evidence 
of an increase in marijuana use among teenagers. On the other hand, based on the same datasets, 
Pacula et al. (2013) find some evidence that specific dimensions of medical marijuana laws, 
such as home cultivation and legal dispensaries, appear to be positively associated with 
marijuana use.  
Only a few studies focus on adults, even though the marijuana prevalence rate is 
actually higher among young adults than among juveniles from survey data. (For example, see 
Table E1 in Appendix E.) Gorman and Huber (2007) use a time series framework and do not 
find any significant change in marijuana use among arrestees from the Arrestee Drug Abuse 
Monitoring data (ADAM). But their data were limited to a small portion of arrestees with 
available urine test samples from only four cities in a short time span. Based on the public-use 
state-level NSDUH data, the estimates from Harper et al. (2012) are positive but insignificant 
for young adults aged 18–25. However, the fixed-effect estimates in Harper et al. (2012) may 
not be very precise because the public-use NSDUH only provides state-level data on marijuana 
use as two-year moving averages with the intention of reducing within-state variation.  
One limitation in existing studies is that they largely ignore the intensive margin. For 
example, Anderson et al. (2013) show that the prices of high-quality marijuana are decreasing 
over time after legalization. As consumption may respond to price at both the extensive and 
intensive margins, the small-to-none estimated effects in the above studies could be a result of 
ignoring the intensive margin. Based on the restricted version of the NSDUH, with access to 
individual-level data, a new working paper from Wen et al. (2014) suggests strong legalization 
effects on both the extensive and intensive margins. For adults aged 21 or above, they find an 
increase in the probability of marijuana use of 16% and an increase in marijuana use frequency 
of 12–17 %. They find an even larger increase for heavy marijuana use, with a 15–27% increase 
in the probability of marijuana dependence.   
Adding to the still-limited literature, this paper focuses on adults and estimates the 
effects of medical marijuana laws on illegal use among non-patients. Specifically, I use 
marijuana possession arrests at the city level from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) for the 
years 1988–2008. To address the concern that arrests could be biased if law enforcement 
endogenously responds to these medical marijuana laws, I supplement the analysis by using 
the state-level marijuana treatment admissions that are not referred by the criminal justice 
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system from the Treatment Episode Data Sets (TEDS) for the years 1992–2008. Although 
arrests and treatments do not measure marijuana use directly, as they represent frequencies 
rather than individuals, conceptually they are able to capture changes not only at the extensive 
margin but also at the intensive margin. Also, arrest and treatment data represent objective 
measures, and they do not suffer from the self-reporting bias that is common in survey data 
(Golub et al., 2005; Harrison et al., 2007). It is particularly important in the current context, 
since people may report more honestly after legalization (Miller and Kuhns, 2011). Another 
advantage of these datasets is that they cover a period during which 12 states legalized medical 
marijuana and provide more observations at the city/state levels than many survey datasets. 
This can reduce potential imprecision in some existing estimates that are based on only a few 
law changes or a small number of observations at the state level. 
In this paper, I adopt a more robust difference-in-difference (DD) research design. As 
in the standard DD type approach, I estimate reduced-form models for the effects of medical 
marijuana laws on marijuana arrests/treatments, conditioning on city/state and year fixed 
effects. To relax the assumption of parallel trends in the standard DD approach, I control for 
city/state-specific time trends (linear or quadratic) to allow for different trends of 
arrests/treatments in each city/state. Therefore, my models can account for empirically 
important unobserved cross-city/state heterogeneity in both levels and trends. Drawing 
inference from marijuana arrests and treatments, I find that the main effect of these laws on 
adult males was to increase illegal marijuana usage. From the UCR, medical marijuana laws, 
on average, are associated with a 15–20% increase in marijuana possession arrests among adult 
males. The results from the TEDS are consistent with the findings from the arrest data, 
indicating a 10–15% increase in marijuana treatments among adult males. Further examination 
reveals that the increase in marijuana treatments mainly comes from referrals without prior 
treatment episodes. The estimates indicate a 20% increase in first-time marijuana treatments 
that excludes any recidivism.   
As there are more and more states passing medical marijuana laws, this paper addresses 
the heated policy debate on these laws by presenting evidence for an increase in illegal use 
among non-patients. Figure 1 shows that the marijuana possession arrest rates move closely 
with daily use rates but opposite to marijuana prices.1 This is consistent with the finding that 
                                                             
1 In Figure 1, the marijuana arrests are the yearly averages of arrest rates from my sample, the daily marijuana use 
rates are among ages 19–28 from Monitoring The Future (MTF), and marijuana prices (without control for purity) 
are from the 2012 National Drug Control Strategy Data Supplement. All series in Figure 1 are normalized to mean 
zero and standard deviation one. 
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daily marijuana use rates among arrestees (of all offenses) from the ADAM data are twice as 
high as they are among the general population (Golub and Johnson, 2002). The marijuana 
arrests are also highly correlated with marijuana treatments, with correlation coefficients 
around 0.3–0.5.2 Therefore, marijuana arrestees are probably concentrated on heavy users as 
marijuana treatment patients, and a significant part of the 10–20% increase should be viewed 
as changes at the intensive margin. By using data reflecting effects on potentially heavy users, 
this research is more relevant to the design of policy because heavy usage is associated with 
negative health and social outcomes, such as developing dependence and the future use of hard 
drugs (Chen et al., 1997; Fergusson et al., 2006; Gruber et al., 2003).    
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes these medical marijuana laws and 
their potential impact on law enforcement. I discuss the data and results from the UCR arrests 
in Section 3 and those from the TEDS treatments in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background  
2.1. Medical Marijuana Laws  
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, smokable marijuana was discovered to have a 
positive effect on patients suffering from nausea, a common symptom among cancer patients 
and the increasing number of AIDS patients (Pacula et al., 2002). With growing evidence of 
positive medical effects and lobbying by marijuana legalization advocacy groups such as the 
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), many states have joined 
in passing a new wave of medical marijuana legislation since 1996. Table A1 in Appendix A 
provides an overview of each state’s medical marijuana laws (for legal documents, see  
ProCon.org, 2014). 
These laws permit patients with legally designated diseases and syndromes to use 
marijuana as a means of treatment. The designated symptoms and conditions typically include 
AIDS, anorexia, arthritis, cachexia, cancer, chronic pain, glaucoma, migraines, persistent 
muscle spasms, severe nausea, seizures, and sclerosis. Some laws, such as the one in California, 
even allow use for “any other illness for which marijuana provides relief.” Most states have a 
state registration system that issues medical marijuana cards to registered patients.3 In principle, 
patients need to register to be exempted from state penalty, but they may be able to use 
                                                             
2 To calculate these correlation coefficients, I normalize the state-level averages of marijuana arrest rates or ratios 
to mean zero and standard deviation one in each state. The treatment ratios are also normalized in each state. 
3 California created a registration program in 2004 but registration was voluntary. Maine passed an amendment 
in November 2009 that later created a voluntary registration program. Washington does not have a registration 
program.  
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“affirmative defense of medical necessity” in courts if they are arrested on marijuana charges. 
Patients can legally possess marijuana up to a fixed amount, but the amount differs by state 
(ProCon.org, 2014).   
Most of the state medical marijuana laws passed prior to 2007 do not directly allow 
marijuana dispensaries in order to conform to federal regulations in which marijuana remains 
a Schedule I drug. But these laws allow patients to cultivate marijuana for their own use, and 
they also allow “caregivers” (most of whom are patients as well) to grow and provide marijuana 
to patients on a not-for-profit basis. Some marijuana dispensaries with grey legal status exist, 
but how prevalent they are largely depends on the attitude of the local government (often at the 
city level) and the actions of local law enforcement, which could change from time to time. 
New Mexico was the first state to pass a law in 2007 with a provision to license production and 
distribution at the state level.4 Laws and amendments passed after 2008 began to set specific 
regulations on dispensaries, and a very small number of state-licensed dispensaries came into 
being. 
Because even designated syndromes such as chronic pain could be defined subjectively, 
such legislation potentially provides a way for recreational marijuana users to become legal 
patients. However, before 2009, the number of legal patients remained relatively small except 
in California.5 A very imprecise estimate from ProCon.org (2012) indicates that, as of January 
2009, the total number of legal patients was about 270,000 people, or 0.19% of the population 
in medical marijuana states. In 2009, the Obama administration stated that the federal 
government would no longer seek to arrest medical marijuana users and suppliers so long as 
they conformed to state laws. Since then, the number of registered patients and dispensaries 
has increased significantly (Caplan, 2012; Mikos, 2011; Sekhon, 2009). For example, based on 
the statistics from the Colorado Department of Health and Environment, Colorado had only 
5,051 registered patients in January 2009, but the number skyrocketed to 99,902 by July 2010, 
implying that about 2.6% of adults were legal patients. Although this statement appeared to 
largely resolve the legal dispute between state and federal governments, the Obama 
administration’s medical marijuana policy began to reverse in 2011, and there have been 
several cases of DEA raids on medical marijuana dispensaries that arguably conform to state 
laws (Dickinson, 2012).   
                                                             
4 The first state-licensed marijuana provider in New Mexico was not approved until March 2009. Dispensaries 
are considered to be legally protected in California (Senate Bill 420, 2003) and Colorado; their laws do 
recognize the existence of dispensaries even though they are silent as to their legality (Pacula et al., 2013).  
5 There is no official number of patients for states without registration. However, based on the large number of 
dispensaries, it is believed that California has many more patients than other medical marijuana states.  
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2.2. Impact on Law Enforcement 
In principle, these medical marijuana laws only provide legal protection for patients 
and caregivers, and do not change the legal status of the non-medical use of marijuana. 
However, there is a huge grey area and the legal boundary is blurred by these loosely worded 
laws (Cohen, 2010). For example, the Colorado attorney general, John W. Suthers, has said, 
“But in Colorado it’s not clear what state law is” (Johnson, 2009).     
The impacts on the actions of enforcement toward the supply side largely depend on 
local attitudes. Although marijuana can be legally grown and sold under the protection of 
medical purposes, it is still a Schedule I drug under federal regulations. In fact, many 
dispensaries are not strictly legal even under state laws; for example, some appear to operate 
on a for-profit basis (DEA, 2011). Many dispensaries and caregivers are considered to be legal 
covers for illegal drug dealing and are constantly being raided by the DEA (DEA, 2011). On 
the other hand, as the DEA generally needs cooperation from local law enforcement 
organizations, its actions are inevitably constrained by local attitudes, which can differ greatly 
even within a state. For example, although San Diego County failed to challenge the state 
medical marijuana law in court, it is able to set a very restrictive policy toward dispensaries 
and its law enforcement organizations actively cooperate with the DEA. Even the only county-
licensed dispensary was forced to close in 2012 (Anderson, 2012). In contrast, it is said, 
although perhaps with some exaggeration, that in Los Angeles and San Francisco there are 
more marijuana dispensaries than Starbucks coffee shops (NPR, 2009; Coté et al., 2008). In 
general, due to the increase in marijuana supply and partial legal protection, it is clear that more 
legal resources are required to keep the previous level of enforcement. As legal resources are 
mostly limited, enforcement toward marijuana supply, on average, is likely to decrease.  
In comparison to the impacts on the supply side, the direct impacts on enforcement 
toward low-level possession offenses appear to be small due to a small number of legal patients 
(at least prior to 2009). Still, there might be some negative impacts that could lower the level 
of law enforcement. Based on a report done by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO, 
2002), these laws do create some confusion for enforcement toward possession offenses. For 
example, California law only requires patients to possess a "written or oral recommendation" 
from their physician, thus not requiring the recommendation to be documented. Even in states 
with mandatory registration systems, some law enforcement officials and district attorneys 
have said that they were less likely to pursue marijuana cases where someone had an amount 
of marijuana within the medical use limit, and would probably be approved for being a legal 
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patient if they did apply (GAO, 2002). Because of the limited resources, they would rather 
pursue marijuana cases that qualify for felony charges or cases involving other drugs, like crack 
cocaine or methamphetamines, which are often associated with violent crimes. Moreover, law 
enforcement organizations believe there has been a general softening in public attitude toward 
marijuana. For example, Denver passed a referendum to legalize marijuana possession in 2005; 
Seattle passed an initiative in 2003 that requires authorities to make cases involving marijuana 
offenses the city's lowest law enforcement priority. Even though these laws are legally 
ineffective since they directly violate the state laws, they may still affect the actions of local 
law enforcers. In fact, in a letter response to the GAO report, the Department of Justice strongly 
complained that the GAO report failed to consider the deteriorating relations between federal 
and local law enforcement [the letter is in Appendix V in GAO (2002)].   
 
3. Analysis of the Uniform Crime Reports   
3.1. The UCR data 
The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) arrest data is an administrative series of monthly 
police records from state and local police agencies across the U.S compiled by the FBI. It 
provides information on marijuana possession arrest counts by age, gender, and race along with 
agency populations (estimated from the Census).6 Because a person may be arrested several 
times, each arrest count does not necessarily represent a single individual. The UCR arrest data 
has a hierarchy rule, under which arrests are only recorded according to the most serious 
offense. As a result, arrestees classified under marijuana possession do not simultaneously 
commit other, more serious crimes (such as cocaine possession or other violent or property 
crimes). Because the FBI reviews and checks the data using annual arrest totals (Akiyama and 
Propheter, 2005), I use the yearly aggregated arrest data provided by the Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) for the years 1988 through 2008.7 I use 
data starting from 1988 to avoid potential influences from decriminalization. Eleven states 
decriminalized marijuana in the 1970s, though there were only minor differences across non-
                                                             
6 Another marijuana arrest category is marijuana sale/manufacture. To be recorded as a sale arrest, the amount 
must exceed some minimum with intention to sell. Because marijuana transactions often involve small quantities, 
and sale intention is hard to prove, sale arrest is often due to large-scale transactions. In fact, some marijuana 
possession arrestees are probably low-level sellers (Jacobson, 2004). 
7 2008 was the latest data available when I began this study. Although data through 2011 became available recently, 
looking at the period prior to 2009 has an advantage in that the number of legal patients was relatively small, and 
the federal policy was fairly uniform prior to the Obama administration. In addition, severe economic recession 
may affect drug use, and theoretically the direction is ambiguous (Bretteville-Jensen, 2011).   
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decriminalized and decriminalized states in the late 1980s (Pacula, Chriqui, and King 2003; 
Pacula et al. 2010).8    
Since participation in the UCR program is generally voluntary, many agencies do not 
report every month or every year, and they may not report data in all categories. Although it is 
not possible to distinguish a true zero from missing data, the FBI communicates regularly with 
agencies located in cities of more than 50,000 city residents to ensure data quality (Akiyama 
and Propheter, 2005), and most missing data is from agencies with small populations and those 
that do not report for a whole year (Lynch and Jarvis, 2008). Therefore, I use police agencies 
located in cities with populations greater than 50,000; as population size is generally increasing 
over time, I include earlier observations from these cities to make the panel more balanced. (I 
exclude 233 city-year observations that have populations less than 25,000). 9  Similar to 
Carpenter (2007), and as is common in the criminology literature, I focus on adult male arrests 
and use observations only if the agencies report arrests for marijuana possession for at least six 
months in that year.10 The final panel consists of 751 cities and 12,157 city-year observations 
in which about half of the cities are observed in at least 20 years. The sample covers 11 medical 
marijuana states that passed laws before July 2008, including Alaska, California, Colorado, 
Hawaii, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington. 
Vermont is not in the sample because no city from Vermont in the UCR has a population greater 
than 50,000. (Michigan passed its law in November 2008 and is coded as a non-medical 
marijuana state.) As shown in Figure 1, at least nationally, changes in marijuana possession 
arrests from the above sample construction appear to be consistent with changes in marijuana 
use: marijuana possession arrests move positively with daily use and negatively with price, and 
it looks exactly like a supply curve moving along a downward-sloping demand curve. 
In addition to adult male marijuana possession arrest rates per 100,000 city residents, I 
create two other measures of marijuana arrest: the ratios of marijuana possession arrests to all 
                                                             
8  Nevada also decriminalized marijuana possession in 2001. “Decriminalization” here is better termed as 
depenalization, since marijuana possession is still legally a crime and subject to arrest. It is different from recent 
decriminalization in California (effective January 1, 2011) and Massachusetts (effective January 2, 2009) that 
removed the criminal status of marijuana possession. Empirically, depenalization has little or no effect on 
marijuana use (MacCoun et al., 2009; MacCoun, 2010; Pacula et al., 2005).  
9 For agencies in MSAs with more than 50,000, about 70% of the population lives in cities. Also, 70% of the 
observations of all MSA agencies are city agencies. I restrict the sample to cities because marijuana transactions 
and arrests are concentrated in cities. On average, marijuana arrest rates in cities are about twice as many as in 
non-cities. 
10 I include 213 city-year observations that report only in December, since some agencies report annually; their 
means and standard deviations are similar to observations that report for at least six months. I only consider males 
both to be consistent with the existing literature and because males are much more likely to be in the criminal 
justice system than are females. For example, the average arrest rate for adult males in my sample is seven times 
that of adult females. 
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offense arrests among adult males, and the ratios of marijuana possession arrests to all drug 
possession arrests, also among adult males.11 These two measures of arrest ratios have the 
advantage that they can partially account for unobserved changes in available legal resources 
and measurement errors from estimated populations (Carpenter, 2007; Fryer et al., 2010). 
Theoretically, the all-drug arrest ratio is the most appropriate measure, because it is not biased 
by other policies that might affect overall drug possession arrests. For example, California 
passed Proposition 36 in 2000; it diverts nonviolent drug arrestees to drug treatment programs, 
which appears to have had negative impacts on overall drug arrests (Gardiner, 2012). 12 
However, missing data in non-marijuana drug arrests could introduce substantial measurement 
errors in the all-drug arrest ratio. 
Table 1 lists the means and standard deviations of these different arrest measures. The 
first row is for all states, the second row is for states without effective medical marijuana laws 
before July 2008, and the third row is for states with effective medical marijuana laws before 
July 2008, excluding California and Colorado. These two states are separated in the last two 
rows. California has many more observations than any other state, and Colorado has the 
second-largest number of observations among the medical marijuana states, so I will study 
these two states separately to see if there are any heterogeneous effects. In particular, prior to 
2009, most dispensaries were located in California and Colorado (mostly California), and they 
were the only states providing legal protection for dispensaries (Pacula et al., 2013).13 Also, 
the penalty in these two states for low-level possession was the lowest in the U.S., with only a 
$100 maximum fine (Pacula et al., 2010). The legalization effects and reactions of law 
enforcement could be different from other medical marijuana states. 
 
3.2. Empirical Model 
From Figure 1, at the national level, changes in marijuana arrests do not seem to be 
driven by changes in law enforcement. In particular, changes in prices are likely to be driven 
by changes in law enforcement, while arrests and prices move in opposite directions. However, 
at the state or city level, there is evidence that law enforcement indeed plays a role. For example, 
Table 1 shows that the marijuana possession arrests are significantly lower in medical 
                                                             
11 The UCR provides the category of total drug possession arrests as well as three subcategories other than 
marijuana: 1. Opium, cocaine, and their derivatives; 2. Truly addicting synthetic narcotics; 3. Other dangerous 
nonnarcotic drugs (methamphetamine is in this category). 
12 Arizona also passed a similar law in 1996. I thank an anonymous referee’s suggestion for these examples.  
13 As mentioned in Note 4, New Mexico passed a medical marijuana law in 2007 that explicitly allows dispensaries, 
but the first state-licensed marijuana provider in New Mexico was not approved until March 2009.  
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marijuana states (with t-statistics around 10). Because marijuana use rates are higher in medical 
marijuana states based on survey data (for example, see Table E1 in Appendix E), it suggests 
that the level of law enforcement could be lower in medical marijuana states. Furthermore, 
Figure 2 shows that marijuana arrests (yearly averages) increase more slowly in medical 
marijuana states than in non-medical marijuana states. Therefore, there seem to be differences 
in law enforcement toward marijuana possession not only in levels but also in trends. (The 
graphs for trends in each state are in Appendix F.) In this section, I propose an empirical model 
that is able to account for unobservable cross-city/state heterogeneity (such as law enforcement) 
in both levels and trends, and briefly discuss its limitations. 
Marijuana arrests are constantly reported by government agencies, and they are 
generally consistent with other indicators of marijuana use, such as marijuana treatment 
admissions or emergency department mentions of marijuana.14 Several studies such as Conlin 
et al. (2005) and Fryer et al. (2010) use arrests as a proxy for drug use. However, arrests are 
criticized for potential bias from police actions, and some other studies actually use arrests as 
a measure of law enforcement to estimate its effects on drug use (DeSimone and Farrelly, 2003; 
Farrelly et al., 2001; Pacula et al., 2010). I illustrate the relationship between arrests, law 
enforcement, and marijuana use by a simple decomposition below, and use this decomposition 
as the basis for my empirical model.              
Marijuana arrests in a particular city-year can be modeled as follows: 
 
(1) A = ∑  Nj=1 Fj ×  P(Xj), 
 
where N is the number of marijuana users, Fj is individual j’s transaction or use frequencies; 
P(Xj) is the probability of being arrested per transaction or per use, a function of Xj, including 
city-specific factors such as local law enforcement and individuals’ characteristics, such as age 
and race. As heavy users have higher use frequencies, and they also probably face a higher 
arrest probability, arrests are concentrated on heavy users.15 Assume that the probability of 
                                                             
14 For example, the correlation coefficient between the number of marijuana arrests and emergency department 
(ED) mentions of marijuana is about 0.4. The ED data is from the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) from 
1994 to 2001 at the MSA level. I aggregate marijuana arrests to the MSA level, and calculate the correlation 
coefficient using normalized values.  
15 Unlike the market for cocaine or heroin, marijuana transactions are embedded in social networks and very “safe.” 
For example, based on the NSDUH, Caulkins and Pacula (2006) find that most people obtain marijuana indoors 
(87%), from a friend or relative (89%), and for free (58%). This suggests that the probability of being arrested 
may be very low for most casual users and most marijuana arrestees are heavy users who make regular transactions. 
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being arrested is the same for every j and ignore potential heterogeneity across demographic 
groups for now. Letting ?̅? be the average of Fj and taking logs, then in a particular city-year: 
 
(2) log(A) = log(N) + log(F̅) + log(P). 
 
Differentiate both sides of (2), and the percentage change in arrests can be decomposed into 
the percentage change in marijuana use, either from the extensive or intensive margins, and the 
percentage change in arrest probability. Note that the arrest probability, log(P), can be treated 
as a source of measurement errors in a dependent variable.16 Similar decomposition can be 
applied to treatment admissions as well, as they also represent frequencies rather than 
individuals.  
It is straightforward to generalize the decomposition to account for heterogeneity in 
arrest probability across demographic groups. Let A= ∑  Gg=1 Ag, then: 
 
(3) ∆log(A) ≈ ∆A / A = ∑  Gg=1 ∆Ag / A = ∑  
G
g=1 ωg ∆Ag /Ag, where ωg = Ag / A.  
 
Therefore, changes in arrests can be approximately viewed as a weighted average of changes 
in arrests across demographic groups, where the weight, ωg, is given by the proportion of each 
group and positively correlated with a group’s arrest probability. 
There are some implications from the above decomposition for identifying the effects 
of medical marijuana laws based on marijuana arrests. First of all, a cross-sectional comparison 
of arrests is clearly inappropriate due to different arrest probabilities. Second, changes in arrests 
may be able to capture changes in marijuana use if there are no associated changes in arrest 
probabilities. In a regression framework, it implies that, on average, the residuals of log(P) 
(after partialling out covariates such as fixed effects and specific trends) are not a function of 
medical marijuana laws. Third, the direction of bias will be the same as the direction of changes 
in arrest probability. In particular, if law enforcement endogenously responded to medical 
marijuana laws, the direction of bias would depend on whether the law enforcement becomes 
stricter or slacker toward marijuana possession offenses. Finally, if there is heterogeneity in 
policy effects across demographic groups, the estimates may disproportionately reflect the 
effects on the groups with greater arrest probabilities. Although the estimates remain consistent 
                                                             
16  In general, in addition to law enforcement, there are other sources of measurement errors, such as the 
hierarchical recording rule of the UCR: arrestees who possess marijuana but also commit other, more serious 
crimes will not be counted as marijuana possession arrestees.  
13 
so long as the arrest probability of each group is not a function of medical marijuana laws, the 
interpretation of the estimates would be different from survey data (even ignoring the intensive 
margin).    
In this paper, I adopt a flexible specification to account for unobserved heterogeneity 
such as law enforcement, and estimate city- and year-specific arrests as a function of whether 
the state has an effective medical marijuana law in place in that year. Specifically, for city i in 
state s and year t, I estimate the following model by OLS: 
 
(4) log(Aist) =  β Lawst + City  fixed effectsi + Year fixed effectst  
          + City linear or quadratic time trendsit + εist,  
 
where Lawst is a dummy variable indicating whether a state s had an effective medical 
marijuana law during year t; for the first year, Lawst equals 1 if the law is effective before July 
1st, and equals 0 otherwise.17 In addition to city and year fixed effects, I include city-specific 
linear or quadratic time trends to capture the time-varying unobservables within a city. As 
shown in Appendix F, the trends of marijuana arrests in each state are indeed quite different. 
This model specification is able to account for differences in existing trends and is more 
flexible than a model with only city fixed effects. If unobservables related to marijuana arrests, 
such as law enforcement, do not deviate from a city trend when states enact medical marijuana 
laws, this approach will uncover the causal effects of these laws. In the main specification, 
because city-specific time trends and fixed effects have already accounted for any smooth-
trending variables, and there are missing data in some potential control variables, I do not 
include any control variables in order to keep a larger sample size. (See Appendix Table B2 
for robustness checks.) Throughout this paper, the estimated standard errors are clustered at 
the state level and therefore are robust to serial correlation, within-state spatial correlation, and 
heteroskedasticity.  
   
3.3. The Results 
Table 2 shows the estimates from three different measures of marijuana arrests. The 
dependent variables are the logarithm of the arrest rate in the upper panel, the logarithm of ratio 
                                                             
17 Same as Anderson et al. (2013), I code the law based on the effective date rather than the passing date (it only 
significantly differs for Nevada) as there were instances (Arizona in 1996 and D.C. in 1998) that the referenda 
were vetoed by the state government or Congress. Note that there could be a huge time lag between the law being 
legally effective and the marijuana program starting to operate and accept applications. 
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of marijuana possession arrests to all offense arrests in the middle panel, and the logarithm of 
ratio of marijuana possession arrests to all drug possession arrests in the lower panel. The first 
three columns, Columns (1) through (3), show the estimates of β based on Equation (4). The 
estimates are small and insignificant for the arrest rate, but positive and significant for the two 
arrest ratios, with or without the inclusion of city-specific time trends. If we interpret the log 
points as a percentage change, medical marijuana laws, on average, among adult males, result 
in a 9.3–12.1% increase in the ratio of marijuana arrests to all arrests and a 14.1–15.9% increase 
in the ratio of marijuana arrests to all drug arrests.  
Note that each observation is a city-year, while Lawst only varies at the state level. 
Therefore, the estimates of β are essentially weighted least square estimates on state-level 
averages, where the weights are given by the numbers of city-years in each state. As California 
and Colorado account for more than 80% of observations in medical marijuana states, the 
positive estimates in Columns (1) through (3) might be entirely driven by these two states, 
especially California. Therefore, I separately control for the effects of California and Colorado 
laws by including CA× Lawst and CO× Lawst, two interaction terms of Lawst, and dummies for 
California or Colorado. (So the legalization effects in California or Colorado are the sum of the 
estimate for Lawst and the estimate for CA× Lawst or CO× Lawst.)  
These results are presented in Columns (4) through (6). First, note that the estimates for 
CO× Lawst are always negative regardless of different measures and specifications, and suggest 
roughly a 10−20% decrease in marijuana arrests in Colorado. So the positive estimates on the 
two arrest ratios in Columns (1) through (3) are not driven by Colorado. Based on the 
specification with only city fixed effects, the estimates for CA× Lawst are close to zero for the 
arrest rate, but they are positive for the two arrest ratios. Because the estimates for Lawst in 
Column (4) are essentially zero for all three measures, it suggests that the positive estimated 
effects on the two arrest ratios under the specification without time trends in Column (1) are 
entirely driven by California. In contrast, with the inclusion of city-specific time trends, nearly 
all of the estimates for CA× Lawst become negative, so the inclusion of California in Columns 
(2) and (3) actually lowers estimated legalization effects, especially in the arrest rate and all 
arrest ratio. Based on the specification with quadratic time trends, the estimated legalization 
effects in California are around a 3.7% (0.201 − 0.164) increase in the arrest rate (with t-stat = 
1.48), an 8.7% (0.224 − 0.137) increase in the all arrest ratio (with t-stat = 2.98), and a 16.1% 
(0.145 + 0.016) increase in the all-drug arrest ratio (with t-stat = 7.69). As the estimates for 
CA× Lawst do not significantly differ from the estimates for Lawst in the all-drug arrest ratio, 
which is the only measure that is able to account for changes in law enforcement toward all 
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drugs, the smaller estimated effects in California in the arrest rate and all arrest ratio are 
probably a result of a lower enforcement level toward all drugs. As mentioned previously, a 
plausible explanation for the lower overall drug arrests could be the passage of Proposition 36 
in California in 2000.  
Conditioning on California and Colorado, with the inclusion of city-specific time trends, 
the estimated legalization effects in Columns (5) and (6) are positive and significant in all three 
measures, including the arrest rate. Moreover, the estimates for Lawst are similar across the 
three different measures, so they are not driven by fluctuations in overall arrests or drug-
possession arrests. Based on the specification with quadratic city time trends, conditioning on 
California and Colorado, medical marijuana laws, on average, have resulted in a 20.1% 
increase in the arrest rate, a 22.4% increase in the ratio of marijuana arrests to all arrests, and a 
14.5% increase in the ratio of marijuana arrests to all drug arrests among adult males. 18 
Although not reported in the paper, the estimates are quantitatively similar if city-specific time 
trends are replaced by state-specific time trends, or only a single time trend and its square, for 
all medical marijuana states. Therefore the positive estimates are not simply driven by the 
specifications of time trends. In addition, not only are these state/city-specific time trends 
jointly significant, but the estimates for the single group time trend are also significant, 
suggesting that the trending in medical marijuana states is indeed different from non-medical 
marijuana states. This is consistent with Figure 2 and provides further support for the 
specifications with time trends over the specifications with only fixed effects. In Appendix B, 
Table B1, I check the robustness of the results in Columns (5) and (6) based on different 
constructions of the sample. Table B2 shows that the estimates are nearly identical when a set 
of city- and state-level control variables are included. Since there are missing data in the 
controls, and most state-level controls are actually poorly estimated, I prefer the specification 
without any controls to keep a larger sample. Table B3 shows the estimates based on alternate 
coding of the first year of the laws.  
To further examine whether these estimates are still sensitive to the number of cities in 
each state, I estimate the effects of laws using state-level averages so each state receives the 
same weight regardless of its number of city-years. The results are in Columns (7) and (8) in 
Table 2. Under the specification with quadratic time trends, the estimates are quantitatively 
                                                             
18 The slightly smaller estimates from the ratio of marijuana to all-drug arrests are expected. Because marijuana 
arrests account for about half of drug arrests and appear in both numerator and denominator, there is less variation 
in this measure. The estimates raise to around 0.2 if I use the ratio of marijuana arrests to non-marijuana drug 
arrests as a dependent variable.   
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similar to those from city-level regressions. It suggests that, after conditioning on California 
and Colorado, these estimates are not driven by states with more cities and the estimated 
legalization effects are fairly homogenous.19  
Since the estimates for Lawst conditional on California and Colorado are essentially 
zero if only city fixed effects are included, one might be concerned that the positive legalization 
effects in Columns (5) and (6) simply come from the model specification of time trends. To 
address this, I provide graphical evidence for the effects of medical marijuana laws on arrests 
(without California and Colorado) for all three measures in Figures 3a (arrest rate), 3b (all 
arrest ratio), and 3c (all-drug arrest ratio). (The scales in Figure 3b are larger than the other two 
figures.) In each figure, the upper graph shows the average adult male marijuana arrest 
rates/ratios (in logarithms) before and after the passage of medical marijuana laws, where the 
X-axis measures the year relative to the state’s law change, with 0 denoting the year of enacting 
the law, 1 denoting the following year, and so on. To create a synthetic control group, I compute 
an average of the log arrest rates/ratios in non-medical marijuana states for each year, and then 
take a weighted average of these yearly averages, in which the weights come from the relative 
composition of years in the treatment group (medical marijuana states). For instance, in “Year 
0,” 58% of observations in the treatment group are from Oregon and Washington, which passed 
laws in 1998 (coded as 1999); 2% of observations are from Maine, which passed laws in 1999 
(coded as 2000); and so forth. So the weight put on the year 1999 average arrest rate in the 
control group is 0.58; the weight put on the year 2000 average arrest rate is 0.02, and so on. In 
other words, in “Year 0,” 58% of the observations in the control group are selected from 1999, 
2% are from 2000, etc. The treatment group shows a significant jump in arrests from “Year -
1” to “Year 0.” The arrests seem to decline in “Year 3” and “Year 4,” especially in arrest rates; 
however, it is a coincidence, because most observations in “Year 3” and “Year 4” are from the 
early 2000s, when the arrests were relatively lower nationally (see Figure 1). To illustrate this 
directly, in the lower graph in each figure, I create a graph similar to the upper one, but I remove 
the national trend by plotting the residuals of log arrests that partial out year fixed effects. After 
removing the national trend, the control group is nearly a horizontal line. In contrast, the 
treatment group shows a persistent jump after legalization. Note that the magnitude of the jump 
is about 0.15, which is close to the regression results above. 
                                                             
19 To further check that the estimates are not driven by one or two states, I also experiment with excluding one 
of each state from the sample, or dropping Oregon and Washington that account for 60% of the remaining 
medical marijuana states. The results are robust to all of these changes (not reported).   
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I focus on the all-drug arrest ratio in the rest of this section, as this measure can account 
for changes in overall drug arrests, which seem to bias down the estimates on the arrest rate 
and all arrest ratio when California is included. The results based on all arrest ratios and arrest 
rates are quantitatively similar to those based on the all-drug arrest ratio if California are 
Colorado are excluded.  
Recall in the model section, the estimates above from Table 2 reflect a weighted average 
of legalization effects across different demographic groups. To examine potential 
heterogeneity in legalization effects, Table 3 shows the estimated legalization effects on all-
drug arrest ratios within each age and race group. These race/age-specific all-drug arrest ratios 
are able to account not only for the fact that African Americans or younger people are more 
likely to be in the criminal justice system for any crimes but also that they are more likely to 
be arrested for drug possessions. Because there are some zero values in each age/race group, 
the results are estimated from a fixed-effect Poisson model in which I control for city linear or 
quadratic time trends along with city and year fixed effects. For robustness, I present both the 
results based on all medical marijuana states in Columns (1) and (2) and the results based on 
the sample without California and Colorado in Columns (3) and (4). First note that, in the first 
row, the estimates on all adult males from a fixed-effect Poisson model are quite similar to 
those in Table 2, and therefore they are not sensitive to different assumptions on the functional 
forms. Also similar to Table 2, the estimates are not sensitive to the exclusion of California and 
Colorado. The next seven rows show the estimates on ages 18–20 through ages 45 and above. 
The legalization effects are largest among young adults aged 21–29 and decrease with age, 
while most of the estimates for the oldest age groups (ages 40–44 and age 45+) are small and 
insignificant. Because marijuana use is higher among young adults, the relative magnitudes of 
estimates in each age group are consistent with what people would normally expect. One might 
be concerned that there could be substantial measurement errors in these age-specific all-drug 
arrest ratios. (Roughly 5% of observations in each age group report only marijuana arrests 
without other drug arrests.) However, the results remain qualitatively similar when I estimate 
the effects of laws based on age-specific all arrest ratios (not reported).20  
                                                             
20 Similar to Table 2, the estimate magnitudes based on all arrest ratios tend to be larger (smaller) than those in 
Table 3 when California and Colorado are excluded (included). I also find around a 15% increase in marijuana 
arrests among juveniles aged 15–17 based on the all arrest ratio, but no significant effects based on the all-drug 
arrest ratio. The estimates on juveniles are very sensitive to different measures, which could be due to the fact that 
the data on juvenile crime and custody rates are much less complete than the associated data for adults (Carpenter, 
2007).   
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It is well documented that minorities, especially African Americans, are much more 
likely to be arrested for marijuana possession (Fellner, 2009; Ramchand et al., 2006). Because 
African Americans are probably overrepresented in the data and account for about one-third of 
marijuana possession arrests, the estimates in Table 2 may overly reflect the legalization effects 
on African Americans. In Table 3, the last two rows show the estimates on all-drug arrest ratios 
among blacks and whites.21 These race-specific arrest ratios include females, since the UCR 
does not separate gender within races. The estimates are quite similar across blacks and whites, 
and there is no substantial racial difference in the estimated effects. Although not reported here, 
the racial composition of marijuana arrestees does not change either. Therefore, the fact that 
African Americans are overrepresented in the data does not appear to affect the estimated 
effects in Table 2. Note that the homogenous estimated effects across races can partially 
address the concern of changes in law enforcement. Since African Americans tend to live in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods that attract more police attention, and probably due to potential 
racial profiling, they are often disproportionally affected by police actions. A controversial 
instance is New York City’s “stop and frisk” practice, which exhibits significant racial 
disparities in low-level marijuana possession arrests (Fellner, 2009; Golub et al., 2007). 
Because these all-drug arrest ratios have accounted for the higher arrest probability for drug 
possession among blacks, if we still see a much larger increase in marijuana possession arrests 
among blacks, then it is likely to be driven by stricter law enforcement rather than by these 
medical marijuana laws. However, the estimates are similar across races and do not suggest 
stronger law enforcement.  
In Table 4, I investigate the dynamic responses of the adult male arrests to the adoption 
of medical marijuana laws. In Columns (1) and (2), I replace Lawst with a set of dummy 
variables, Years 0–1 through Years 10–11 (the maximum lag), which indicate each two-year 
interval after the medical marijuana laws were enacted. The estimates tend to be increasing 
over time, except for Years 6–7 and Years 8–9, in which the estimates are small and 
insignificant. In Column (3), I include an additional dummy, Years (neg. 1–2), which indicates 
the two-year interval before the passage of the laws. The estimates for this dummy are small 
and insignificantly different from zero, and the estimates remain similar for post-law dummies, 
which indicates that policy endogeneity is not a serious concern in this context. In the latter 
three columns, Columns (4) through (6), I check the sensitivity of estimates with the exclusion 
                                                             
21 I focus on blacks and whites as Asians and Indians only account for a very small proportion of arrestees.   
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of California and Colorado. All estimates become somewhat larger and show an even stronger 
pattern of increasing over time.   
  Based on marijuana possession arrests from the UCR, I find positive legalization effects 
on illegal marijuana use, which appear to be increasing over time. The effects are larger for 
younger populations, but fairly homogenous across races. As discussed in the model section, 
these estimates are robust to existing differences of enforcement across cities in levels and 
trends. However, these estimates will be biased if law enforcement or other sources of 
measurement errors are a function of these medical marijuana laws. On the one hand, the 
qualitative evidence from Section 2.2 suggests that law enforcement toward marijuana 
possession probably becomes more tolerant and therefore biases down these estimates above. 
The hierarchical rule in the UCR data could potentially bias down the estimates as well. For 
example, as any violent or property crimes have a higher hierarchy than marijuana possession, 
these higher hierarchical crimes could take place if the increase in marijuana use also results in 
more crimes. On the other hand, there exist several other factors that could potentially bias 
these estimates up. First of all, the legal boundary is blurred due to legalization, and law 
enforcement might need more legal resources to fight marijuana dealers, since some of them 
are now under legal cover. The potential increase in resources toward sale/manufacture 
offenses could result in a spillover effect on low-level possession offenses. For example, in 
order to trace people higher up in the distribution chain, police may arrest more individuals for 
low-level possession. More importantly, not only police actions but individuals’ perceptions 
and reactions toward police actions will affect the arrest probability. Because people in medical 
marijuana states are likely to perceive a lower legal risk after legalization, even if there are no 
changes in law enforcement, they may become less cautious and thus increase their probability 
of arrest.  
There are indeed indications of the threat to identification from changes in law 
enforcement. For example, the estimated effects in California are sensitive to measures that are 
not able to account for the fluctuations in law enforcement toward overall drug offenses. The 
negative estimates in Colorado also raise questions about the validity of marijuana arrests being 
a proxy for marijuana use. In Appendix B, Figure B1 shows that marijuana arrests in Colorado 
move closely with the number of police officers, and thus arrests may capture the changes in 
the law enforcement rather than the changes in marijuana use. There is a substantial drop in the 
number of police officers around the time of legalization in 2001, which could be the reason 
for negative estimates in Colorado. Although Figure B1 shows that marijuana arrests in 
California and other medical marijuana states do not seem to be driven by the number of police 
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officers, which provides some indirect support for marijuana arrests being a valid proxy, other 
potential unobserved changes in law enforcement continue to be a threat to identification. To 
address these limitations of marijuana arrests, I supplement the analysis by studying marijuana 
treatment admissions that are not directly influenced by law enforcement. As Figure 1 indicates, 
marijuana arrests move closely with daily marijuana use. Because heavy users are likely to be 
associated with dependence and the need for treatment, I use marijuana treatment patients to 
provide more evidence that medical marijuana laws increase heavy use in the next section.  
 
4. The Analysis of Treatment Episode Data Set 
4.1. The Data 
The treatment data is from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration’s (SAMHSA) Treatment Episode Data Set (TEDS) for the years 1992 through 
2008. The TEDS collects admission data from all substance-abuse treatment facilities that 
receive public funding in each state. Some states collect data on all patients in these publicly 
funded facilities, but other states only collect data on publicly funded patients. For each 
admission, the data identify the primary, secondary, and tertiary substance abuse problem of 
the patient, use frequencies of these drugs, demographics such as gender and age, referral 
sources, and the number of prior treatments the patient had received. Similar to the UCR, each 
admission does not represent an individual, but it is possible to create a measure representing 
individuals by using admissions without any prior treatment. To be consistent with the previous 
analysis of the UCR arrests, I also focus on adult (above age 18) male admissions. About 40% 
of treatment admissions are referred by the criminal justice system, 30% are referred by patients 
themselves or other individuals, and around 20% are referred by health care providers and 
alcohol or drug abuse care providers.22 I exclude admissions referred by the criminal justice 
system; therefore, the data are not directly affected by changes in law enforcement. 
(Admissions with missing referral sources are also excluded.)     
Since some states only collect data on publicly funded patients, probably due to changes 
in available funding, the total number of admissions greatly fluctuates in some state-years. For 
instance, the total number of admissions in Washington after 1999 was only about half of the 
previous level. Therefore, as commonly used by the SAMHSA, I create ratios of marijuana 
treatments to all substance treatments within non-criminal justice referrals for each state. I 
                                                             
22 The remaining 10% of admissions are referred by community or religious organizations, and self-help groups 
such as Alcoholics Anonymous (AA). School referrals are very small, as I focus on adults.  
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define marijuana-related treatment admissions as such if marijuana is identified as the primary, 
secondary, or tertiary abuse problem, marijuana-primary treatment admissions as such if 
marijuana is recorded only as the primary abuse substance, and marijuana-non-primary 
treatment admissions as such if marijuana is recorded as either secondary or tertiary abuse 
substance. The sample includes all medical marijuana states that passed laws before July 2008; 
except for Alaska, from which data is missing for most years, they have data in every year.23 
Table 5 presents means and standard deviations of these treatment ratios (in percentage points) 
among non-criminal justice referrals. About one-third of admitted patients have marijuana 
abuse problems. Among these marijuana-related treatment admissions, about a quarter of 
admissions have marijuana as the primary problem, and three-quarters of admissions have other 
substances as the primary problem. Actually, among all non-criminal justice referrals, 50% of 
their primary problems are alcohol, around 30% are cocaine and heroin, and only 8% are 
marijuana. This is consistent with the notion that, while marijuana is the most commonly 
abused illegal substance, marijuana itself is not strongly addictive. In contrast with the arrest 
data, the marijuana-related treatment ratios are indeed higher in medical marijuana states (other 
than California and Colorado) than in other states (with t-statistics 1.85). This is consistent with 
the higher prevalence rates in medical marijuana states from survey data. (Note that marijuana-
related treatment ratios are consistent with how drug use rates are defined in survey data.) 
Interestingly, marijuana-primary treatments are lower in medical marijuana states (with t-
statistics -3.09). Because individual referrals account for almost 60% of all non-criminal justice 
referrals, this could reflect a lower perceived risk in medical marijuana states.24 Table 5 also 
shows that both California and Colorado have much lower marijuana treatment ratios than other 
medical marijuana states. In fact, Colorado has the lowest marijuana treatment ratio among all 
states.  
To obtain a measure representing individuals and therefore excluding recidivism, I also 
construct the ratio of first-time marijuana treatments to (all-times) all substance treatments.25 
This measure can avoid potential bias from recidivism, which is a problem particularly when 
                                                             
23 Alaska does not report referral sources for the years 1998–2003, and it does not report any data for the years 
2004–2007. 
24 I also separately look at admissions referred only by health or substance abuse care providers, which should 
reflect the use of professional criteria of marijuana abuse and are less biased by the general public’s perception of 
marijuana. I find that for professional referrals, the primary marijuana treatment ratios in medical marijuana states 
are similar to those in non-medical marijuana states, and they are not statistically different from each other (with 
t-statistics 0.86). All of the estimates based only on professional referrals are quantitatively similar. They are 
available upon request.  
25 It is not possible to observe whether a patient has had prior treatment episodes for a particular substance; only 
the number of previous treatment episodes a patient has had for any drug or alcohol problem is available. 
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using treatment data (Anderson, 2010). A drawback of this measure is that the information on 
the number of previous treatments is largely missing in some state-years. For example, Arizona 
and Delaware do not report any first-time treatments and thus they are not in the sample. 
Fortunately, except for Washington, which does not report this information for the years 1992–
1999, this information is very complete in medical marijuana states, with an average missing 
rate of 1.7%. I restrict the sample to state-years that are missing less than 50% of the 
information on the number of previous treatments, and scale the treatment ratios by the 
proportion of reporting data in each state-year. (The point estimates in the next section are 
slightly greater without scaling, but the estimated standard errors are around 10–20% larger.) I 
also exclude 17 state-years with zero first-time marijuana treatments and three state-years with 
less than five first-time marijuana-primary treatments, including Rhode Island in 2003 and 
2004. Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for these (scaled) first-time treatment ratios 
among non-criminal justice referrals (in percentage points). Note that the denominators are the 
same as those in Table 5, so it suggests that roughly half of marijuana treatment patients are 
first-time patients. Figure 4 shows the yearly averages of marijuana-related treatment ratios 
(upper graph) and first-time marijuana-related treatment ratios (lower graph). The trends in the 
upper graph are quite similar to those in the lower graph (except for Colorado), which indicates 
that the proportion of first-time treatments does not change over time.  
 
4.2. The Results 
 To examine the effects of medical marijuana laws on marijuana treatments, I estimate 
the following model by OLS: 
 
(5) Yst = β Lawst + CA× Lawst + CO× Lawst + State fixed effectss + Year fixed effectst + State  
                   time trendsst + εst ,  
 
where Yst is the logarithm of marijuana treatment ratio in state s and year t. As in the previous 
section, I include state fixed effects as well as state-specific trends to account for unobserved 
state heterogeneity in both the levels and trends. (Appendix G shows the trends of marijuana-
related ratios in each state.) In addition to the dummy variable for legalization, Lawst, I 
separately control for two interaction terms, CA× Lawst and CO× Lawst, to see whether the 
legalization effects in California and Colorado are different from other medical marijuana 
states. As in the UCR analysis, I do not include any controls to keep a larger sample size. The 
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results in this section are nearly identical when the same set of state-level controls is included 
or estimated by a fixed-effect Poisson model (not reported).  
 In Table 7, the upper panel shows the estimated legalization effects on marijuana-
related treatment ratios (with any number of previous treatment episodes) among non-criminal 
justice referrals. In Columns (1) though (3), I estimate the effects of laws based on all medical 
marijuana states, including California and Colorado. All estimates for Lawst are insignificant. 
The estimate is negative when only state fixed effects are included; the estimates are positive 
but small when state-specific time trends are included. In the latter three columns, (4) through 
(6), I estimate the legalization effects conditional on California and Colorado. The estimates 
show a pattern similar to the results from the arrest data in Table 2. When the specification 
includes only fixed effects, the estimate of Lawst is negative and insignificant, while they are 
positive and significant with the inclusion of state time trends. Under the specification with 
state-specific time trends, in terms of percentage change, on average, medical marijuana laws 
increased the marijuana-related treatment ratio by 9.1–10.5% among non-criminal justice 
referrals. 
Remember that the UCR arrest data impose a hierarchical recording rule so that each 
arrest count is only recorded in one category. Because each admission has only one primary 
substance, marijuana-primary treatments are defined in a way that is more similar to marijuana 
arrests.26 In particular, marijuana-primary treatment ratios and the all-drug arrest ratio are 
roughly comparable measures. In the lower panel of Table 7, the first three columns, Columns 
(1) through (3), show the estimated effects of medical marijuana laws on primary treatment 
ratios. Under the specification with state-specific time trends [Columns (2) and (3)], 
conditioning on California and Colorado, these medical marijuana laws result in a 13.7–14.1% 
increase in primary treatments among non–criminal justice referrals. This estimated effect of 
around 14% on primary treatments is indeed very close to that on all-drug arrest ratios in Table 
2. As a sensitivity analysis, in the latter three columns, Columns (4) through (6), I estimate the 
effects on marijuana-non-primary treatments. The estimates on non-primary treatments are 
qualitatively similar to those on primary treatments. Quantitatively, as expected, the estimates 
show a smaller increase of 7.3–9.4% in secondary and tertiary treatments (with the inclusion 
of time trends). Note, however, that since the estimated standard errors are also larger among 
primary treatments, the estimates for Lawst between primary and non-primary treatments are 
                                                             
26 The author thanks an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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not statistically different. 27  The larger estimated standard errors probably come from my 
sample construction. Among all primary-marijuana treatment patients, about 40% of them are 
juveniles aged 12–17, and about 60% of them are criminal justice referrals. In contrast, for all 
marijuana-non-primary treatments admissions, only 7% are juveniles and 40% are referred by 
the criminal justice system. Because I focus on adults and non-criminal justice referrals, the 
proportion of marijuana-primary treatment admissions is small in my sample and therefore 
lowers the precision of the estimates. In Appendix C, Table C1 and C2 show the results from 
criminal justice referrals. In Appendix D, I find legalization effects of similar magnitudes on 
juveniles aged 15–17.    
In Table 7, the estimates for CA× Lawst are positive with only state fixed effects but 
negative with state-specific time trends. For marijuana-primary treatments, under the 
specification with quadratic time trends, the estimate for CA× Lawst is almost identical to the 
estimate based on all-drug arrest ratios from Table 2. The estimate suggests a 15.2% increase 
in marijuana-primary treatment, and it is not statistically different from the effects of other 
medicinal marijuana laws. For non-primary treatments, with the inclusion of time trends, the 
estimated effects in California are smaller but also not statistically different from other medical 
marijuana laws. The estimates for CA× Lawst are quite sensitive to time trend specifications, 
however, especially from primary treatments. The sensitivity is perhaps due to finite sample 
bias. Unlike the arrest data, in which there are a few thousand observations in California, there 
are only 17 observations in the treatment data. The estimates for CA× Lawst may not be very 
precise. In addition, as seen from Figure 4, the marijuana treatments in California didn’t change 
much after legalization until year 2001.28 The potential finite sample bias may be aggravated 
as the identification of CA× Lawst is largely based on observations after the year 2000. In fact, 
the estimated effects in California are always positive and significant regardless of time trend 
specifications if controlling for the years of 1997 to 2000 (not reported). Although not reported, 
the estimated legalization effects with the inclusion of California are nearly identical to the 
estimates of Lawst in Table 7. Therefore, the legalization effects in California do not appear to 
be vastly different from other states.  
                                                             
27 In fact, I cannot find from any sources an indication as to what the exact criteria are to define a substance as the 
primary problem in the TEDS. Since it may be difficult to distinguish a primary drug if a patient is addicted to 
multiple drugs, the definition could be somewhat subjective and not entirely consistent.    
28 The small-to-none legalization effects in California in the first few years are not surprising, because California 
was the first state to legalize marijuana, and it was not clear during that time if the law was able to survive under 
pressure from the federal government.    
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In contrast, the small and insignificant estimates in Columns (1) through (3) in Table 7 
are actually driven entirely by the large but negative estimates for CO× Lawst. The estimated 
effects on marijuana treatments are around a 30–40% decrease, which are even greater (in 
absolute terms) than the estimated effects of a 10–20% decrease on arrests. As the legalization 
effects are unlikely to be negative in Colorado, the negative estimates raise doubts about 
whether marijuana treatment admissions are a good proxy. The implausibly large negative 
estimates for Colorado are partly due to alcohol treatments. Colorado has one of the highest 
alcohol treatment ratios, and the number of alcohol treatments in Colorado doubles after 2001, 
which coincides with the year of medical marijuana legalization. In Appendix C, Table C3, I 
estimate the effects on marijuana treatment ratios that are constructed without alcohol. While 
the estimated effects remain negative when I exclude alcohol treatments, the estimates for 
Colorado indicate a smaller decrease of around 10% in marijuana treatments.29  
In Table 8, the upper panel shows the estimates on first-time marijuana-related 
treatment ratios. Columns (1) through (3) are based on all medical marijuana states, and 
Columns (4) through (6) are conditional on California and Colorado. Since a proportion of 
addictive patients will repeatedly enter treatment, we would expect the estimates based on first-
time treatments to be smaller than estimates from all treatments. The popular notion that 
marijuana is a gateway drug also suggests a smaller estimate from first-time patients as the 
proportion of patients reporting cocaine and heroin abuse is actually monotonically increasing 
with the number of previous treatments.30 Somewhat surprisingly, nearly all of the estimates in 
Table 8 are more than twice as great as the estimates in Table 7. (The denominators of first-
time treatment ratios are same as those of the treatment ratios in Table 7.) In the upper panel, 
in Columns (1) through (3), all of the estimates of Lawst on first-time marijuana related 
treatment ratios are positive regardless of time trend specifications. With the inclusion of state-
specific time trends, medical marijuana laws result in a 15.5–20.9% increase, on average, in 
first-time marijuana-related treatments. In Columns (4) through (6) in the upper panel, 
conditioning on California and Colorado, the estimates are slightly larger and suggest a 17.8–
25.0% increase in first-time treatments. In the lower panel of Table 8, I present the estimates 
on primary and non-primary first-time treatments. These estimates are generally similar to each 
                                                             
29 The estimated effects on marijuana treatment ratios without alcohol for other medical marijuana states remain 
similar. (See Appendix Table C3.) I do not find any significant changes in alcohol treatments after medical 
marijuana legalization except for in Colorado.   
30 For first-time marijuana-related treatment admissions, 37% of patients also report cocaine abuse and 6% report 
heroin abuse. On the other hand, among patients with at least one previous treatment, the proportion that reports 
cocaine and heroin abuse increases to 49% and 11%, respectively. 
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other (except without time trends) and similar to those in Table 7. Under the specifications with 
time trends, the estimates indicate a 15.3–19.9% increase in primary treatments and an 18.0–
26.8% increase in non-primary treatments. The estimates on primary treatments seem to be 
smaller than those on non-primary treatments, but the differences are not statistically different. 
Note that first-time treatments account for about half of all marijuana treatments and the 
estimates on first-time treatments are roughly twice as great, which implies that the estimates 
in Table 7 are entirely driven by first-time treatments. In fact, I estimate the effects of laws on 
patients with at least one previous treatment episode, and the results are essentially zero (not 
reported). It is straightforward to see graphically that the estimates above are driven by first-
time treatments. Figure 5, constructed in the same way as Figure 3s, shows the effects of laws 
on marijuana-related treatment ratios (in logarithm) among non-criminal justice referrals. (As 
in Figure 3s, California and Colorado are excluded from the sample.31) The upper graph is from 
all-times treatments, and the lower graph is from first-time treatments. The scale in the lower 
graph is twice as great as the scale in the upper graph. Both graphs show similar patterns of 
increase in marijuana-related treatments after the passage of laws in medical marijuana states, 
but the magnitude of increase is much greater for first-time treatments.  
The estimates for CA× Lawst in Table 8 show a pattern similar to those in Table 7; they 
are positive with only state fixed effects but negative with state-specific time trends. The 
estimates suggest smaller legalization effects in California than in other medical marijuana 
states, but the differences are not always statistically significant. As in Table 7, this sensitivity 
to time trend specifications appears to be due to the period of the first few years of legalization 
and a smaller number of observations from state-level data. In contrast, nearly all of the 
estimates for CO× Lawst suggest positive legalization effects in Colorado. For example, in 
Columns (5) and (6), the estimates in the upper panel indicate a 4.7–8.8% increase in first-time 
marijuana-related treatments in Colorado. I also experiment with excluding alcohol treatments. 
In Appendix Table C3, in the lower panel, the estimated effects in Colorado are actually larger 
than other medical marijuana states for first-time marijuana treatments without alcohol. It is 
also consistent with the estimates for CO× Lawst in Table 9 below, which are not statistically 
different from other medical marijuana states and indicate about a 13% increase in first-time 
treatment rates. Because the estimated effects in Table 7 mainly come from effects on first-
                                                             
31 I also construct the graphs with the inclusion of California and Colorado, and they show a similar pattern with 
slightly smaller magnitudes. It is because the TEDS data do not overweight these two states as the UCR arrest 
data do.      
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time marijuana treatments, the similar estimates in Colorado on first-time treatments imply that 
the true causal effects in Colorado are probably similar to other medical marijuana states. 
Because treatment ratios might be biased by changes in other substances, in Table 9 I 
estimate the effects on treatment rates per 100,000 state residents for robustness checks. As 
mentioned previously, the total number of admissions in Washington halved after 1999, so I 
drop Washington from the sample. Note that the estimates in Table 8 are actually not identified 
by Washington because it does not provide information on previous treatments for the years 
prior to legalization (1992–1999). In Table 9, the upper panel shows the estimates on 
marijuana-related treatment rates [Columns (1) and (2)] and first-time marijuana-related 
treatment rates [Columns (3) and (4)]. For comparison, the lower panel shows the estimates on 
marijuana-related (first-time) treatment ratios without Washington in the sample. As shown in 
the table, when Washington is excluded from the sample, although in the upper panel the 
estimates for Lawst are only significant for first-time treatment rates, their magnitudes are very 
similar to those from treatment ratios in the lower panel, except for one instance [Column (2)]. 
Therefore, the estimates on treatment ratios in previous tables are not a result of changes in 
other substances.  
  In the literature, use in the past month is often defined as currently using a drug. Since 
we expect these laws to increase marijuana use not only at the extensive margin but also at the 
intensive margin, if the increase in treatments mainly comes from patients who do not currently 
use marijuana, it will raise serious concerns that the estimated legalization effects are spurious. 
For instance, due to medical marijuana legalization, rehabilitation facilities might give priority 
to light marijuana users who would not be enrolled otherwise. It would introduce upward bias 
in the estimates. The TEDS provides information on five categories of use frequencies: no use 
in the past month, 1–3 times in the past month, 1–2 times in the past week, 3–6 times in the 
past week, and daily use. I combine the two categories of use in the past week and create four 
different marijuana-related treatment ratios separately for each category of use frequency. In 
Table 12, the upper panel shows the descriptive statistics for these ratios.32 Around one-third 
of marijuana-related treatment patients have not used marijuana in the past month, one-third of 
them have used marijuana in the past month or week but not daily, and another one-third of 
them use marijuana on a daily basis. In the lower panel, I estimate the legalization effects 
                                                             
32 Roughly 5% of marijuana treatment admissions have missing information on use frequencies. The observations 
decrease to 799 because 22 state-years do not report this information in all of their marijuana-related treatments. 
All of them are from non-medical marijuana states. In addition, 11 state-years in Nebraska report zero admissions 
of daily use, and three state-years in Arkansas report zero admissions of use of 1–3 times in the past month. (These 
zeroes are included in the sample.) 
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separately for each category of use frequencies. I employ a fixed effect Poisson model because 
of some zero values. Conditional on California and Colorado, the estimated legalization effects 
are largest among patients who have used marijuana 1–3 times in the past month and 1–6 times 
in the past week, which indicates about a 15% increase in these marijuana-related treatments. 
For patients who have not used marijuana in the past month, the effects are insignificant, and 
they are close to zero when quadratic time trends are included. So there is no evidence that the 
estimated effects from Table 7 are driven by an increase in noncurrent users. However, the 
estimates on daily use suggest a smaller effect of around an 8% increase, and they are very 
noisy and insignificant. Note that the proportion of daily marijuana users is in fact similar 
across first-time treatments and treatments with at least one previous treatment episode. So the 
smaller effects on daily use are not because the main effects are mainly from an increase in 
first-time treatments. As medical marijuana laws are likely to lower people’s perceived risks 
toward marijuana, one potential explanation is that some of the most addicted people might 
become less likely to seek treatment after legalization, and therefore there could be downward 
bias in these estimates on daily use. Due to similar reasons in previous tables, the estimated 
effects for California are sensitive to time trend specifications, while the estimated effects for 
Colorado are always negative. Although not reported here, the results from primary treatment 
ratios are qualitatively similar but the estimate magnitudes are larger.  
In summary, consistent with the results from the UCR marijuana arrests, the estimates 
from the TEDS indicate around a 10–20% increase in marijuana treatments after medical 
marijuana legalization.33 The effects mainly come from referrals who currently use marijuana 
and first-time marijuana referrals. There are some interesting implications from the fact that 
there are only effects on first-time treatments but not on treatments with prior treatment 
episodes. First, the estimated legalization effects are not a result of recidivism. Second, it 
suggests that medical marijuana laws do not have a significant effect on strongly addicted 
patients who repeatedly enter treatment. These patients could be “always-takers” who would 
be heavy marijuana users regardless of marijuana’s legal status. Third, consistent with existing 
medical evidence, it implies that marijuana is not strongly addictive. Finally, because repeated 
patients consist of a greater proportion of cocaine and heroin users, it does not support the 
                                                             
33 Under the specification of linear time trends, the dynamic responses of marijuana treatments show a strong 
pattern of increasing over time, and they are not sensitive to the inclusion of California and Colorado. However, 
the estimates become very noisy under the specification of quadratic time trends. I also estimate the legalization 
effects within each age group. For primary treatments, the relative magnitudes are similar to those in the arrest 
data; the estimates are largest among ages 21–34 and tend to decrease with age. However, for non-primary 
treatments, the estimates are largest among ages 35–44. These results are available upon request.   
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popular belief that the use of marijuana increases usage of hard drugs. In fact, there could even 
be a substitution between hard drugs and marijuana.  
The treatment data have an advantage over the arrest data in that they are not directly 
influenced by changes in law enforcement. In particular, the estimates for Colorado on first-
time treatments appear to be more consistent with other medical marijuana states. However, 
the treatment data still face several limitations due to lack of direct measures of marijuana use. 
For instance, the estimates on all-times marijuana treatments for Colorado suggest large 
negative effects, which appear to be driven by changes in alcohol treatment admissions. 
Because the treatment data are at the state level, there could exist finite sample bias in estimates 
for individual states, such as the estimates for California and Colorado. Still, it is less likely 
that the positive estimates on arrests and treatments are both biased up in a similar way. On the 
contrary, it seems to be possible that both the estimates on arrests and treatments are biased 
down due to a more liberal attitude toward marijuana. Because these medical marijuana laws 
may also change people’s perception of marijuana in states without laws, these difference-in-
difference estimates could just be a lower bound for the legalization effects.  
 
5. Discussion of Results and Conclusion 
 In this paper, I estimate the effects of medical marijuana laws on illegal marijuana use 
based on marijuana possession arrests. To address potential bias from changes in law 
enforcement, I also use marijuana treatments that are not referred by the criminal justice system 
as another proxy for heavy use. I find that medical marijuana laws are associated with a 10–
20% increase in marijuana arrests and treatments, suggesting a positive legalization effect on 
illegal marijuana use. Based on existing studies, MacCoun (2010) suggests that the non-price 
effect of marijuana decriminalization would be around a 35% increase in general use rate (use 
in past month). Although medical marijuana laws represent a less dramatic change than 
decriminalization, a 10–20% increase is not particularly large, since arrests and treatments 
capture both the intensive and extensive margins. This magnitude is also comparable to policy 
changes regarding alcohol and their associated substitution effects with marijuana (Conlin et 
al., 2005; DiNardo and Lemieux, 2001). In fact, the estimated effects from this study are very 
close to the new findings from Wen et al. (2014) that are based on the restricted version of the 
NSDUH.  
There are several obvious limitations of this study. First, as already discussed in the 
paper, potential endogenous responses of police, rehab facilities, or treatment patients would 
introduce biases with unknown directions. Secondly, the arrest and treatment data are not able 
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to separately identify the extensive and intensive margins. In particular, this paper is not able 
to answer whether these medical marijuana laws increase initiation rates among general 
populations. Based on the still-limited literature that generally suggests a small or nonexistent 
effect on the extensive margin, most of the estimated effects in this paper are probably from 
changes at the intensive margin. However, since estimates in existing studies often come with 
large estimated standard errors, this conclusion should be treated with some caution.34 Last but 
not least, as in all previous studies, this paper assumes homogeneity in these medical marijuana 
laws across states. However, the growing difference in the numbers of patients and dispensaries 
across states since 2009 suggests that these laws may have become more and more 
heterogeneous. For example, Pacula et al. (2013) finds some evidence that the differences in 
the details of these laws could imply different legalization effects. Future studies will contribute 
to this ongoing policy debate by more carefully framing research questions corresponding to 
potential heterogeneities in both the drug users and policies, and by studying data of better 
quality that are able to identify effects at different margins.  
In summary, due to the preliminary stage of the literature on medical marijuana laws, 
this paper alone is far from able to provide a definitive conclusion; rather, it presents evidence 
that some indicators of heavy marijuana use do respond to these medical marijuana laws. The 
estimates in this paper are appropriate for inference only on populations “at-risk” of being 
arrested or entering treatment, who are likely to be heavy users. They are still relevant to policy 
because heavy marijuana users are often associated with negative health and social outcomes, 
such as developing dependence and the need for treatment. A 20% increase in heavy users, as 
indicated by both arrests and first-time treatments, represents a nontrivial cost to society. On 
the other hand, based on the estimates from all-times treatments, the net effect on treatment is 
somewhat smaller, and therefore there could be a substitution between marijuana and other 
substances. This substitution can be viewed as a benefit of medical marijuana laws. Other 
additional benefits may exist. For example, Anderson et al. (2013) and Anderson et al. (2014) 
provide some evidence for a decrease in drunk driving or suicide. Therefore, evaluating the 
                                                             
34 In Appendix D, I illustrate that the noisy estimates based on the TEDS data for juveniles from Anderson, Hansen, 
and Rees (2012) are possibly a result of using population as a denominator for their marijuana treatment measures. 
In Appendix E, I show that the estimates for adults from Harper et al. (2012) are somewhat sensitive to the 
inclusion of state time trends, and they are also sensitive to whether 2009 data are included and how these medical 
marijuana laws are coded. These estimates suggest that the fixed-effect estimates from the public-use NSDUH 
are not very robust, which is likely because the public-use NSDUH only provides two-year moving averages for 
the state-level marijuana use rates. Another potential problem, as Anderson et al. (2012) point out in their analysis 
of the National Longitudinal Survey Youth 97, is that sample sizes in smaller states are often quite small in many 
representative datasets. In fact, obtaining a larger sample size and therefore increasing precision is one of the main 
reasons that the NSDUH only provides the state-level estimates as two-year moving averages (Wright, 2004).    
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effects of medical marijuana laws requires a more complete cost/benefit analysis that is beyond 
the scope of this study.  
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Table 1: UCR Descriptive Statistics (1988–2008) 
Marijuana Possession Arrest for Adult Males (Ages 18+)  
 
 
MJ Arrest Rate 
per 100k City 
Residents 
 
MJ Arrests to All 
Arrests Ratio (%) 
 
MJ Arrests to All 
Drug Arrests Ratio 
(%) 
 
  
 
 Mean SD. Mean SD. Mean SD. Obs. 
# of 
States 
All States                   137.41 (125.73) 3.33 (2.39) 47.42 (26.09) 12,157            (751 cities) 50 
Non-MJ 
States                         162.06 (133.77) 3.85 (2.35) 57.87 (21.53) 
8,007              
(514 cities) 39 
MJ States  
w/o CA & CO   118.12 (84.64) 2.86 (1.89) 47.92 (20.58) 
715                     
(48 cities) 9 
California 80.78 (91.07) 2.20 (2.20) 19.89 (16.02) 3,203                     (174 cities) 1 
Colorado 127.96 (88.22) 2.78 (1.46) 65.22 (16.90) 232                      (15 cities) 1 
    Note.― Medical marijuana states (MJ states) include only states that passed laws before July 
2008; states that passed laws afterward are in non-MJ states. (D.C. is counted as a state.) Vermont 
is not in the sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on Marijuana Possession Arrests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Arrest Rates (per 100k) for Adult Males             
Law -0.051 0.010 0.056 -0.039 0.261*** 0.201** 0.432*** 0.189 (0.052) (0.050) (0.034) (0.069) (0.096) (0.079) (0.151) (0.116) 
CA × Law 
   -0.003 -0.289*** -0.164** -0.444*** -0.087 
   (0.051) (0.095) (0.079) (0.148) (0.112) 
CO × Law 
   -0.143*** -0.632*** -0.376*** -0.799*** -0.384*** 
   (0.051) (0.097) (0.081) (0.154) (0.113) 
         
Arrest Ratio (all arrest) for Adult Males            
Law 0.093* 0.121*** 0.100*** -0.004 0.314*** 0.224*** 0.449*** 0.252*** (0.050) (0.045) (0.035) (0.073) (0.097) (0.075) (0.121) (0.094) 
CA × Law 
   0.128** -0.215** -0.137* -0.345*** -0.119 
   (0.061) (0.098) (0.075) (0.122) (0.090) 
CO × Law 
   -0.033 -0.560*** -0.375*** -0.600*** -0.326*** 
   (0.061) (0.099) (0.077) (0.122) (0.090) 
         
Arrest Ratio (all drug possession) for Adult Males           
Law 0.159** 0.148*** 0.141*** -0.007 0.186** 0.145** 0.146** 0.104 (0.064) (0.034) (0.026) (0.069) (0.082) (0.062) (0.071) (0.064) 
CA × Law 
   0.238*** -0.016 0.016 0.032 0.094 
   (0.063) (0.084) (0.060) (0.071) (0.065) 
CO × Law 
   -0.261*** -0.376*** -0.257*** -0.354*** -0.259*** 
   (0.063) (0.084) (0.068) (0.069) (0.050) 
         
Obs. 12,157 City-years 12,157 City-years 955 State-years 
# of States 50 50 50 
Time trends No Linear Quadratic  No Linear Quadratic  Linear (state)  
Quadratic 
(state)  
Note.― All specifications include city (state) and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 3: Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws in Each Male Age/Race Group   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Arrest Ratio (all drug possession) for Adult Males   
All Adult Males 0.134** 0.135** 0.139*** 0.107*** (0.055) (0.052) (0.046) (0.031) 
Age 18–20 0.076*** 0.026* 0.074* 0.050* (0.023) (0.014) (0.038) (0.028) 
Age 21–24 0.190*** 0.166*** 0.161*** 0.144*** (0.053) (0.043) (0.050) (0.045) 
Age 25–29 0.166*** 0.161*** 0.185*** 0.178*** (0.057) (0.049) (0.065) (0.062) 
Age 30–34 0.148* 0.178** 0.106* 0.073* (0.081) (0.084) (0.064) (0.043) 
Age 35–39 0.133* 0.151** 0.071 0.067* (0.072) (0.060) (0.053) (0.038) 
Age 40–44 0.115 0.092 0.024 0.007 (0.122) (0.099) (0.092) (0.105) 
Age 45 + 0.119* 0.065 0.056 0.011 (0.071) (0.051) (0.104) (0.083) 
Black 0.158*** 0.103*** 0.114** 0.117** (0.040) (0.032) (0.051) (0.050) 
White 0.138** 0.142** 0.138*** 0.091*** (0.061) (0.066) (0.046) (0.028) 
Obs. 12,157 12,157 8,722 8,722 
# of States 50 50 48 48 
CA & CO Yes Yes No No 
City time trends Linear  Quadratic Linear  Quadratic 
Note.― All specifications include city (state) and year fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Dynamic Responses of Marijuana Arrest to Legalization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Arrest Ratio (all drug possession) for Adult Males   
Years         -0.011   0.005 
(neg. 1–2)   (0.021)   (0.040) 
Years   0.115*** 0.083** 0.120** 0.216*** 0.221*** 0.226*** 
0–1 (0.036) (0.035) (0.055) (0.053) (0.063) (0.076) 
Years  0.211*** 0.171*** 0.218*** 0.323*** 0.306** 0.313** 
2–3 (0.053) (0.042) (0.075) (0.110) (0.125) (0.126) 
Years  0.239*** 0.186*** 0.247** 0.418** 0.369** 0.378** 
4–5 (0.068) (0.068) (0.092) (0.162) (0.177) (0.176) 
Years  0.067 0.014 0.076 0.438** 0.422* 0.434* 
6–7  (0.093) (0.133) (0.115) (0.195) (0.226) (0.223) 
Years  0.041 -0.042 0.053 0.707*** 0.697** 0.711** 
8–9  (0.131) (0.190) (0.154) (0.234) (0.291) (0.272) 
Years 0.277** 0.200 0.290*    
10–11 (0.123) (0.242) (0.153)    
Obs. 12,157 12,157 12,157 8,722 8,722 8,722 
# of States 50 50 50 48 48 48 
CA & CO Yes Yes Yes No No No 
City time 
trends Linear  Quadratic Quadratic Linear  Quadratic Quadratic 
Note.― All specifications include city and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: TEDS Descriptive Statistics (1992–2008) 
Marijuana Treatment Ratios (%) for Adult Males   
 
 
Marijuana-related 
 
Marijuana-primary 
 
Marijuana-non-
primary 
 
State-year 
Obs. 
 Mean SD. Mean SD. Mean SD.   
All States                   30.56 (9.56)  7.94 (3.62) 22.69 (7.06) 821  (51 states) 
Non-MJ States                         30.88 (9.21) 8.33 (3.71) 22.64 (6.61)  627  (39 states) 
MJ States w/o 
CA & CO   32.39 (9.25) 7.36 (2.86) 25.04 (7.41)  
 160  
(10 states) 
California 18.79 (2.29) 4.11 (1.93) 14.68 (1.07) 17  (1 state) 
Colorado 13.37 (3.77) 3.00 (0.74) 10.37 (3.26) 17 (1 state) 
Note.― Medical marijuana states (MJ states) include only states that passed laws before July 2008; 
states that passed laws afterward are in non-MJ states.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: TEDS Descriptive Statistics (1992–2008) 
First-time Marijuana Treatment Ratios (%) for Adult Males 
 
 
Marijuana-related 
 
Marijuana-primary 
 
Marijuana-non-
primary 
 
State-year 
Obs. 
 Mean SD. Mean SD. Mean SD.   
All States                   14.1 (6.71)  4.62 (2.41) 9.50 (4.84) 724  (49 states) 
Non-MJ States                         14.48 (6.73) 4.91 (2.46) 9.60 (4.83)  540  (37 states) 
MJ States w/o 
CA & CO   14.40 (6.33) 4.17 (2.02)  10.23 (4.78) 
 150  
(10 states) 
California 9.18 (1.92) 2.75 (1.33) 6.43 (0.76) 17  (1 state) 
Colorado 4.49 (0.83) 1.40 (0.25)  3.09 (0.64) 17  (1 State) 
    Note.― The sample includes only state-years that the information on the number of previous 
treatments is missing less than 50%. Arizona and Delaware do not report any first-time treatments 
and are not in the sample. Medical marijuana states (MJ states) include only states that passed laws 
before July 2008; states that passed laws afterward are in non-MJ states. The denominators of the 
ratios are all-substance treatment admissions with any number of prior treatment episodes and the 
same as those in Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7:  Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on Marijuana Treatments  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Marijuana-related Treatments 
Law -0.098 0.058 0.032 
 -0.074 0.105*** 0.091** 
(0.066) (0.044) (0.063)  (0.055) (0.031) (0.038) 
CA × Law 
    0.211*** -0.120*** -0.055 
    (0.054) (0.042) (0.048) 
CO × Law 
    -0.412*** -0.444*** -0.501*** 
    (0.051) (0.040) (0.047) 
        
 Primary Treatments  Non-primary Treatments 
Law -0.074 0.141** 0.137**  -0.058 0.094*** 0.073* (0.096) (0.059) (0.068)  (0.060) (0.027) (0.038) 
CA × Law 0.548*** -0.248*** 0.015 
 0.139** -0.025 -0.053 
(0.094) (0.064) (0.078)  (0.059) (0.047) (0.052) 
CO × Law -0.530*** -0.591*** -0.632*** 
 -0.377*** -0.387*** -0.442*** 
(0.093) (0.072) (0.075)  (0.054) (0.037) (0.049) 
        
Obs. 821 State-years  821 State-years 
# of States 51 States  51 States 
Time Trends No Linear Quadratic   No Linear Quadratic 
    Note.― All specifications include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8:  Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on First-time Marijuana Treatments  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Marijuana-related Treatments 
Law 0.104 0.209** 0.155** 
 0.091 0.250** 0.178** 
(0.067) (0.093) (0.059)  (0.073) (0.111) (0.070) 
CA × Law 
    0.267*** -0.233* -0.104 
    (0.068) (0.116) (0.083) 
CO × Law 
    -0.140** -0.162 -0.131 
    (0.069) (0.120) (0.083) 
        
 Primary Treatments  Non-primary Treatments 
Law -0.057 0.199 0.153**  0.167* 0.268*** 0.180** (0.079) (0.146) (0.074)  (0.088) (0.098) (0.075) 
CA × Law 0.611*** -0.305** 0.028 
 0.145* -0.143 -0.137 
(0.063) (0.138) (0.084)  (0.086) (0.116) (0.091) 
CO × Law -0.292*** -0.177 -0.162* 
 -0.078 -0.131 -0.089 
(0.067) (0.153) (0.081)  (0.084) (0.106) (0.092) 
        
Obs. 724 State-years  724 State-years 
# of States 49 States  49 States 
Time Trends No Linear Quadratic  No Linear Quadratic 
    Note.― All specifications include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9:  Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on Marijuana-related Treatments  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
    
 Treatment Rate per 100k   
First-time Treatment Rate 
per 100k 
Law 0.112 0.005  0.274*** 0.133* (0.084) (0.054)  (0.098) (0.076) 
CA × Law -0.071 -0.018  -0.236* -0.155 (0.132) (0.103)  (0.131) (0.105) 
CO × Law -0.357*** -0.332***  -0.121 -0.011 (0.081) (0.058)  (0.108) (0.087) 
    
 Treatment Ratio  First-time Treatment Ratio 
Law 0.099*** 0.074*  0.249** 0.178** (0.033) (0.039)  (0.111) (0.070) 
CA × Law -0.116** -0.040  -0.233* -0.104 (0.046) (0.051)  (0.116) (0.083) 
CO × Law -0.434*** -0.481***  -0.164 -0.132 (0.042) (0.047)  (0.120) (0.083) 
    
Obs. 804 State-years  715 State-years 
# of States 50 States  48 States 
Time Trends Linear Quadratic  Linear Quadratic 
    Note.― Washington is excluded from the sample. All specifications include 
state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, 
and they are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws by Use Frequency  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 
 Not in the Past 
Month   
1–3 Times in the 
Past Month   
1–6 Times in the 
Past Week  Daily 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
Mean SD.  Mean SD.  Mean SD.  Mean SD. 
10.07 (5.85)  4.91 (2.16)  6.50 (2.25)  8.46 (3.63) 
 
Estimates from a FE Poisson Model 
Law 0.085 0.027 
 0.150*** 0.137**  0.154*** 0.153***  0.075 0.084 
(0.059) (0.052)  (0.035) (0.062)  (0.048) (0.059)  (0.065) (0.084) 
CA × Law -0.347*** 0.134* 
 -0.392*** -0.128  -0.548*** -0.081  0.205** -0.053 
(0.104) (0.076)  (0.084) (0.081)  (0.077) (0.084)  (0.098) (0.101) 
CO × Law -0.409*** -0.452*** 
 -0.225*** -0.373***  -0.374*** -0.536***  -0.540*** -0.690*** 
(0.062) (0.056)  (0.044) (0.067)  (0.055) (0.067)  (0.056) (0.085) 
            
Obs. 799 State-years  799 State-years  799 State-years  799 State-years 
# of States 51 States  51 States  51 States  51 States 
Time Trends Linear Quadratic   Linear Quadratic   Linear Quadratic   Linear Quadratic 
    Note.― All specifications include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Marijuana Arrest Rates, Prices and Daily Use Rates 1988–2008 (Normalized) 
 
Note. − The marijuana arrests are the yearly averages of arrest rates from my sample, the daily marijuana use 
rates are among ages 19–28 from the Monitoring The Future (MTF), and marijuana prices (without control 
for purity) are from the 2012 National Drug Control Strategy Data Supplement. All series in Figure 1 are 
normalized to mean zero and standard deviation one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2: Marijuana Arrest Rates (upper), Arrest Ratios (middle), and All-Drug Arrest 
Ratios (lower) 1988–2008 
 
  
Figure 3a: Marijuana Possession Arrest Rates (upper) and Their Residuals after 
Partialling Out Year Fixed Effects (lower) 
Note. – California and Colorado are not included. 
 
  
Figure 3b: Marijuana Possession Arrest Ratios (upper) and Their Residuals after 
Partialling Out Year Fixed Effects (lower) 
Note. – California and Colorado are not included. 
 
 
  
Figure 3c: Marijuana Possession All-Drug Arrest Ratios (upper) and Their Residuals 
after Partialling Out Year Fixed Effects (lower) 
Note. – California and Colorado are not included. 
 
  
Figure 4: Marijuana-related Treatment Ratios (upper) and First-time Marijuana-related 
Treatment Ratios (lower), 1992–2008 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5: Marijuana-related Treatment Ratios (upper) and First-Time Marijuana-related 
Treatment Ratios (lower) 
Note. – California and Colorado are not included. 
Appendix A: State Medical Marijuana Laws as of March 20131 
Appendix Table A1: Medical Marijuana Laws 
State Pass/Effective date Pass Rate Registration Possession Limit 
Alaska Nov. 3, 1998 /Mar. 4, 1999 
58% 
(Ballot Measure 8) Yes 
1 oz/6 plants 
(3 mature,  
3 immature) 
Arizona Nov. 2, 2010 50.13% (Proposition 203) Yes 2.5 oz/12 plants 
California Nov. 5, 1996 /Nov. 6, 1996 
56% 
(Proposition 215) 
Yes 
(Voluntary since 
Jan. 1, 2004) 
8 oz/ 
6 mature or  
12 immature  
Colorado Nov. 7, 2000 /Jun. 1, 2001 
54% 
(Ballot Amendment 20) Yes 
2 oz/6plants 
(3 mature,  
3 immature) 
Connecticut May 31, 2012 
96-51 House; 21–13 
Senate 
(HB 5389) 
Yes Not specified yet 
D.C May 21, 2010 /Jul. 27, 2010 
13–0 vote 
(Amendment Act B18-
622) 
Yes 2 oz/Not specified yet 
Delaware  May 13, 2011 /Jul. 1, 2011 
27-14 House; 17-4 Senate 
(Senate Bill 17) Yes 6 oz 
Hawaii Jun. 14, 2000 /Dec. 28, 2000 
32-18 House; 13-12 Senate 
(Senate Bill 862) Yes 
3 oz/7 plants  
(3 mature,  
4 immature) 
Maine Nov. 2, 1999 /Dec. 22, 1999 
61% 
(Ballot Question 2) 
Yes 
(Voluntary) 2.5 oz/6 plants 
Massachusetts Nov. 6,2012 /Jan. 1, 2013 
63% 
(Ballot Question 3) Yes Not specified yet 
Michigan Nov. 4, 2008 /Dec. 4, 2008 
63% 
(Proposal 1) Yes 2.5 oz/12 plants 
Montana Nov. 2, 2004 62% (Initiative 148) Yes 
1 oz/4 plants 
(mature) 
Nevada Nov. 7, 2000 /Oct. 1, 2001 
65% 
(Ballot Question 9) Yes 
1 oz/7 plants  
(3 mature,  
4 immature) 
1  For legal documents and detail, see “18 Legal Medical Marijuana States and D.C.” in ProCon.org website: 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (accessed 03.16.2013). 
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New Jersey Jan. 18, 2010 48-14 House; 25-13 Senate (Senate Bill 119) Yes 
2 oz/Not specified 
yet 
New Mexico Mar. 13, 2007 /Jul. 1, 2007 
36-31 House; 32-3 Senate 
(Senate Bill 523) Yes 
6 oz/16 plants (4 
mature,  
12 immature) 
Oregon Nov. 3, 1998 /Dec. 3, 1998 
55% 
(Ballot Measure 67) Yes 
24 oz/24 plants 
(6 mature,  
18 immature) 
Rhode Island Jan. 3, 2006 52-10 House; 33-1 Senate (Senate Bill 0710) Yes 2.5 oz/12 plants 
Vermont May 26, 2004 /Jul. 1, 2004 
82-59 House; 22-7 Senate 
(Senate Bill 76) Yes 
2 oz/9 plants 
(2 mature, 
7 immature) 
Washington Nov. 3, 1998 59% (Initiative 692) No 24 oz/15 plants 
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Appendix B: Robustness Checks in the UCR Data 
1. Sample Construction 
In Appendix B, Table B1, I check the robustness of the main results based on different 
constructions of the sample. I estimate the effects of medical marijuana laws from a log-linear 
model or a fixed-effect Poisson model, and I separately estimate the legalization effects of 
California and Colorado as (5) and (6) in Table 2. The dependent variables are the arrest rate in 
the upper panel, the ratio of marijuana possession arrests to all arrests in the middle panel, and the 
ratio of marijuana possession arrests to all drug possession arrests in the lower panel [all dependent 
variables are in logarithm except for Columns (5) and (6)].   
In Columns (1) and (2), following Carpenter (2007), I scale arrest counts by a factor that 
equals the fraction reported of a year (12 divided by the number of months reported) using agencies 
that report at least six months (agencies that only report in December are excluded). In Columns 
(3) and (4), I include city agencies that report any number of months without scaling. Since a 
particular problem for the UCR data is that it is not able to distinguish a true zero from missing 
data, in Column (5) and (6), I create a sample based on the same criteria of city populations that 
are greater than 25,000 in any year and 50,000 for at least one year. However, I treat marijuana 
possession arrests from city agencies that report any positive adult male arrests for any drug 
possession but marijuana as true zeros.2 Because of these zeros, I estimate a fixed-effect Poisson 
model in Columns (5) and (6). In the last two columns, Columns (7) and (8), the dependent 
variables are the state level arrest rates/ratios for adult males. I sum up marijuana possession arrests 
to the state level from all available agencies, including any cities and non-cities that report to the 
UCR, and create state-level arrest rates and arrest ratios. All of these estimates show a similar 
pattern to the estimates in Table 2. The estimates for Lawst are positive and indicate roughly a 20% 
increase in marijuana arrests. The legalization effect in California is generally positive, but the 
magnitudes are sensitive to which measures were used. Colorado always shows a negative 
legalization effect. 
 
2. Inclusion of Control Variables 
2 I also use agencies report any positive arrests or any positive adult male arrests to estimate the legalization effects 
on arrest rates and all arrest ratios. The results are quantitatively similar.  
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Table B2 shows the estimates of Lawst when I include a set of control variables. Columns 
(1) – (4) are based on the full sample, and Column (5) – (8) are based on the restricted sample 
without California and Colorado. These control variables include city police officer rates per 
100,000 city residents and other state-level controls: state 0.08 blood alcohol content (BAC) laws, 
unemployment rates, black male population rates (logarithm), per capita local and state 
expenditures on police protection (logarithm), and per capita local and state expenditures on health 
and hospital expenditures (logarithm). The data on city police officer are from the UCR Law 
Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted series, and other state-level controls are from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics or Census Bureau (except for the BAC laws). The sample size is smaller 
when state expenditures are included in the model because 2001 and 2003 government 
expenditures were not developed by the Census Bureau due to sample redesigning. (The slightly 
smaller observations in Columns (1) – (2) and (5) – (6) are due to missing data in city police officer 
rates.) As seen from Table B3, the inclusion of these control variables does not affect the estimates 
of Lawst, and they remain similar to those in Table 2. 
 
3. Coding of Law  
In Table B3, I check the robustness of the main results based on alternate coding of the 
first year of legalization. Same as in Anderson et al. (2013), the dummy for legalization in this 
paper, Lawst, is coded based on the years in which these laws become effective rather than being 
passed. Anderson et al. (2013) code the first year in fractional values, while I round to zero/one if 
the law become effective after/before July 1st. In Table B3, Columns (1) – (4), I show the estimates 
of laws based on the coding in Anderson et al. (2013). Columns (1) and (2) are based on all medical 
marijuana states, and Columns (3) and (4) are based on the sample without California and Colorado. 
The results are nearly identical to those in Table 2 in the paper.  
In Columns (5) – (8), as in Harper et al. (2012), I code the legalization dummy based on 
the years of passage; and regardless in which month the law passed, the first year of passage always 
takes one rather than fraction values. (See Appendix Table A1 for both the passage dates and 
effective dates in each state.3) Except for the estimates on all-drug arrest ratios in Columns (7) and 
3 Remember that California, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington have more city-year observations, and they are more 
affected by this change in coding. As a result, the number of observations for which the legalization dummy takes one 
increases by about 10%. Note that I continue to code Michigan as a non-medical marijuana state in order for the 
estimates in (5) – (8) to be comparable to (1) – (4) and those in the paper. (Michigan passed a law in November, 2008.)  
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(8), most of the estimates in Columns (5) – (8) remain quantitatively similar to the estimates in 
Columns (1) – (4) and those in Table 2, but they are noisier. Recall that the estimates on pre-law 
dummies are close to zero from Table 4 in the paper. As some of these pre-law observations are 
now coded as post-law observations, it is natural that these estimates in (5) – (8) are somewhat 
smaller.  
 
4. Marijuana arrests and the number of police officers 
In Figure B1, in the upper graph, I plot the yearly averages of police officer rates per 
100,000 city residents from the UCR Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted series and 
marijuana possession arrest rates in Colorado from my sample. Both series are normalized to mean 
zero and standard deviation one. I also construct graphs using two arrest ratios and they are almost 
identical (not reported). The strongly positive correlation between marijuana arrests and police 
rates implies that arrests in Colorado may not be a valid measure for marijuana use. The graph 
shows that the number of police officers and marijuana arrests temporary dropped around the year 
of 2001, in which Colorado enacted its medical marijuana law, but both series increased again 
after 2002. It is not clear if these fluctuations are related to the medical marijuana law or come 
from other unobserved factors. But the graph suggests that the negative estimates on arrests in the 
paper are likely to capture the changes in law enforcement instead of changes in marijuana use. 
For comparison, the lower graph in Figure B1 plots the yearly averages of police officer rates and 
marijuana arrest rates in California and other medical marijuana states. The graph shows that 
marijuana arrests in California and other medical marijuana states do not seem to be driven by the 
number of police officers. Note that both series in California move closely with those series in 
other medical marijuana states.  
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Appendix Table B1: Robustness Checks on Sample Construction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Cities reporting at 
least 6 months with 
scaling 
Cities reporting any 
number of months 
without scaling 
Cities reporting any 
arrests to the UCR 
All city and county 
agencies aggregated 
to state level  
 
 
Arrest Rates (per 100k) for Adult Males   
Law 0.229*** 0.178*** 0.333** 0.179* 0.142* 0.173** 0.298** 0.160 (0.082) (0.066) (0.142) (0.106) (0.080) (0.071) (0.126) (0.151) 
CA × Law -0.720*** -0.370*** -0.628*** -0.351*** -0.251*** -0.216*** -0.359** -0.147 (0.081) (0.068) (0.145) (0.109) (0.087) (0.077) (0.137) (0.160) 
CO × Law -0.233*** -0.0880 -0.387*** -0.192* -0.313*** -0.175** -0.518*** -0.259* (0.079) (0.066) (0.144) (0.112) (0.079) (0.070) (0.113) (0.131) 
Arrest Ratios (all arrests) for Adult Males 
Law 0.282*** 0.200*** 0.370*** 0.193** 0.172** 0.170** 0.255*** 0.146* (0.079) (0.063) (0.131) (0.085) (0.086) (0.076) (0.075) (0.082) 
CA × Law -0.156* -0.061 -0.304** -0.151 -0.124 -0.119 -0.160* -0.068 (0.079) (0.062) (0.136) (0.091) (0.094) (0.081) (0.082) (0.093) 
CO × Law -0.615*** -0.360*** -0.605*** -0.363*** -0.226** -0.174** -0.448*** -0.268*** (0.080) (0.065) (0.137) (0.091) (0.088) (0.078) (0.075) (0.073) 
Arrest Ratios (all drug possession arrests) for Adult Males 
Law 0.156** 0.123** 0.243* 0.171 0.124** 0.118** 0.109* 0.087* (0.075) (0.046) (0.139) (0.106) (0.062) (0.056) (0.057) (0.044) 
CA × Law 0.033 0.090** -0.111 -0.055 0.094 0.092 0.009 0.004 (0.073) (0.043) (0.142) (0.108) (0.069) (0.060) (0.059) (0.042) 
CO × Law -0.413*** -0.257*** -0.422*** -0.298** -0.291*** -0.256*** -0.162** -0.140*** (0.075) (0.054) (0.145) (0.114) (0.062) (0.058) (0.061) (0.043) 
Obs. 11,944 11,944 12,676 12,676 13,498 13,498 1,006 1,006 
# of States 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Time 
Trends Linear  Quadratic  Linear  Quadratic  Linear  Quadratic  Linear  Quadratic  
Note.― Columns (1) and (2) include cities that report at least six months, and the arrest counts are 
scaled by a factor that equals the fraction reported of a year. Columns (3) and (4) include cities 
reporting any number of months without scaling. Columns (5) and (6) include cities reporting any 
adult male arrests for drug possession to the UCR and they are estimated from a Poisson model. 
Columns (7) and (8) include all available city and county agencies reporting any positive marijuana 
possession arrests for adult males. All specifications include city (state) and year fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix Table B2: Robustness Checks on Inclusion of Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Arrest Rates (per 100k) for Adult Males             
Law 0.007 0.044 -0.015 0.041 0.330*** 0.224** 0.326*** 0.228*** (0.061) (0.041) (0.058) (0.038) (0.089) (0.084) (0.082) (0.072) 
         
Arrest Ratio (all arrest) for Adult Males            
Law 0.113** 0.099** 0.094** 0.098** 0.351*** 0.250*** 0.339*** 0.247*** (0.049) (0.040) (0.047) (0.039) (0.082) (0.071) (0.076) (0.069) 
         
Arrest Ratio (all drug possession) for Adult Males           
Law 0.116*** 0.138*** 0.103*** 0.136*** 0.187** 0.156*** 0.170*** 0.120** (0.036) (0.041) (0.033) (0.042) (0.073) (0.054) (0.060) (0.051) 
         
Obs. 11,614 11,614 10,491 10,491 8,718 8,718 7,880 7,880 
# of States 50 50 50 50 48 48 48 48 
CA & CO Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
State 
Expenditures  No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time trends Linear Quadratic  Linear Quadratic  Linear Quadratic  Linear Quadratic  
    Note.― All specifications include log city police officer rates and the following state-level 
variables as controls: log black male rates, unemployment rates, and state 0.08 BAC laws. 
Columns (3) – (4) and (7) – (8) also include state and local government police expenditures, state 
and local government health and hospital expenditures. The number of observations in Columns 
(3) – (4) and (7) – (8) are smaller because of missing data in 2001 and 2003. All specifications 
include city and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and they are 
clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Appendix Table B3: Robustness Checks on Coding of Law 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 The first year takes on fractional values and is based on effective date  
The first year takes one and is based on 
passing date 
       
Arrest Rates (per 100k) for Adult Males               
Law -0.009 0.051 0.247*** 0.198**  -0.016 0.037 0.204* 0.178* (0.049) (0.033) (0.081) (0.076)  (0.047) (0.040) (0.118) (0.105) 
          
Arrest Ratio (all arrest) for Adult Males              
Law 0.121*** 0.103*** 0.304*** 0.234***  0.110*** 0.082** 0.219** 0.175* (0.044) (0.034) (0.084) (0.064)  (0.036) (0.035) (0.102) (0.092) 
          
Arrest Ratio (all drug possession) for Adult Males             
Law 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.181** 0.150***  0.136*** 0.143*** 0.084 0.101* (0.037) (0.028) (0.072) (0.051)  (0.036) (0.037) (0.059) (0.059) 
          
Obs. 12,157  12,157 8,722  8,722  12,157  12,157 8,722  8,722 
# of States 50 50 48 48  50 50 48 48 
CA & CO Yes Yes No No  Yes Yes No No 
Time 
trends Linear Quadratic  Linear  Quadratic   Linear  Quadratic  Linear  Quadratic  
    Note.― All specifications include city and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix Figure B1: Marijuana Possession Arrest Rates and Police Officer Rates (Normalized) 
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Appendix C: Additional Results from the TEDS data 
1. Criminal Justice Referral 
For robustness checks, I estimate the effects of laws on marijuana treatment admissions 
among criminal justice referrals. Note that criminal justice referrals are broadly defined as 
patients referred by anyone affiliated with a federal, state, or county judicial system, and they 
may be referred through either civil commitment or criminal commitment. The potential sources 
include diversionary programs, paroles, prisons, court for criminal offense, court for DWI/DUI, 
etc. Therefore, criminal justice referral data are not directly linked to the drug arrest data. Table 
C1 shows the descriptive statistics for both marijuana-primary treatment ratios and marijuana-
non-primary treatment ratios among adult males. All-times treatments are in the upper panel and 
first-time treatments are in the lower panel. The proportion of marijuana-primary treatments 
among criminal justice referrals in Table C1 is 17%, which is about twice as high as the 
proportion among non-criminal justice referrals in the paper. The proportion of marijuana-non-
primary treatments among criminal justice referrals in Table C1 is similar to those among non-
criminal justice referrals in Table 5 in the paper.4 Table C2 presents the regression results. For 
all-times treatments, the estimates for Lawst suggest a positive legalization effect of 8.5–21.9% 
increase in marijuana-primary treatments (but only significant under linear time trends), while 
the estimates on non-primary treatments are negative. For first-time treatments, the estimates for 
Lawst are always positive on both primary and non-primary treatments but they are significant 
only among primary treatments. In summary, the results on primary treatments from criminal 
justice referrals are similar to the results based on drug arrestees and non-criminal justice 
referrals in the paper, but the results on non-primary treatments from criminal justice referrals 
are different.  
 
2. Exclusion of Alcohol-Primary Treatments 
Alcohol accounts for about half of primary abuse problems, and more than 70% of 
treatment admissions are alcohol-related. As the all-drug arrest ratio from the arrest data does not 
include alcohol, I check if the results on marijuana treatments are sensitive to the inclusion of 
4 The composition of marijuana-non-primary treatments is actually quite different. For criminal justice referrals who 
report marijuana as secondary or tertiary problems, 65% of their primary abuse problems is alcohol, 16% is cocaine, 
and 5% is heroin. In contrast, for non-criminal justice referrals who report marijuana as non-primary problems, 54% 
of their primary abuse problems is alcohol, 23% is cocaine, and 12% is heroin. 
10 
                                                             
alcohol. I drop alcohol-primary treatments from the data and create the ratio of marijuana-
primary treatments to all-non-alcohol-substance treatments. (I keep treatments in which alcohol 
is the secondary or tertiary abuse problem.) Because primary treatments are mutually exclusive, 
these primary treatment ratios without alcohol are similar to the all-drug arrest ratio constructed 
form the UCR arrest data. Table C3 shows the regression results. With the exclusion of alcohol-
primary treatments, the estimates for Lawst are slightly greater than those in the paper and 
indicate a 12.1–19.3% increase in all-times marijuana-primary treatment ratios and an 18.2–
27.3% increase in first-time marijuana-primary treatment ratios. Moreover, the estimates are not 
sensitive to the inclusion of California and Colorado [Columns (1) and (2)]. In fact, when 
alcohol-primary treatments are excluded, the estimates for CO × Lawst on first-time treatments 
become positive, suggesting that the legalization effects in Colorado are larger than in other 
medical marijuana states. It implies that the negative estimates for Colorado in the paper are 
largely driven by changes in alcohol treatments. As there is no evidence that medical marijuana 
laws affect alcohol treatments in other states, the huge increase in alcohol treatments in Colorado 
was probably due to idiosyncratic shocks that were unrelated to medical marijuana legalization. 
In Figure C1, I plot total alcohol consumption per capita (sum of beer, wine, and spirit 
consumption per capita) with alcohol-primary treatment ratios in Colorado.5 (Both series are 
normalized to mean zero and standard deviation one.) It is clear from Figure C1 that alcohol 
consumption in Colorado was indeed much higher in early 2000s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Alcohol consumption data is from the 2013 Brewers Almanac developed by the Beer Institute, and it is available 
from the following link: http://www.beerinstitute.org/assets/uploads/Brewers_Almanac-_20131.xlsx. Figure C1 is 
constructed from 1994, as it is the earliest year available for alcohol consumption in the 2013 Brewers Almanac.  
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Appendix Table C1: Descriptive Statistics for Criminal Justice Referrals 
All-times Marijuana Treatment Ratios (%) for Adult Males 
 
 
Primary 
 
Non-primary 
 
 
 
Mean SD. Mean SD. Obs. 
All States                   16.77 (8.39) 22.68 (7.05) 821  
Non-MJ States                         18.16 (8.69) 22.64 (6.61)  627  
MJ States w/o CA & CO   12.79 (5.5) 25.04 (7.41)  160  
California 12.42 (1.97) 14.67 (1.07) 17  
Colorado 7.32 (2.06) 10.37 (3.26) 17 
         
First-time Marijuana Treatment Ratios among Adult Males 
 
 
Primary 
 
Non-primary 
 
 
 Mean SD. Mean SD. Obs. 
All States                   9.26 (5.17) 11.50 (4.61) 721  
Non-MJ States                         10.25 (5.42) 11.09 (4.34)  537  
MJ States w/o CA & CO   6.75 (2.83) 13.52 (4.71) 150  
California 8.32 (0.88) 14.56 (2.28) 17  
Colorado 3.38     (0.94) 4.93 (0.78) 17  
Note.― Medical marijuana states (MJ states) include only states that passed laws before 
July 2008; states that passed laws afterward are in non-MJ states. The denominators are 
all-substance treatment admissions with any number of prior treatment episodes. 
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Appendix Table C2: Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on Marijuana 
Treatments among Criminal Justice Referrals 
 All-times Marijuana Treatment Ratios 
 Primary Treatments    Non-primary Treatments 
Law 0.219*** 0.085  -0.006 -0.072*** 
 (0.070) (0.068)  (0.039) (0.027) 
CA × Law -0.511*** -0.155*  0.189*** 0.159*** 
 (0.086) (0.081)  (0.051) (0.041) 
CO × Law -0.391*** -0.303***  0.070 0.078** 
 (0.066) (0.072)  (0.055) (0.039) 
      
 First-time Marijuana Treatment Ratios 
 Primary Treatments    Non-primary Treatments 
Law 0.364*** 0.175*  0.125 0.046 
 (0.127) (0.104)  (0.120) (0.088) 
CA × Law -0.622*** -0.218*  0.097 0.003 
 (0.143) (0.120)  (0.140) (0.109) 
CO × Law -0.336** -0.179  0.127 0.194** 
 (0.127) (0.114)  (0.121) (0.091) 
Time Trends Linear Quadratic  Linear Quadratic 
Note.― All specifications include state and year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the 
state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix Table C3: Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on Marijuana-
Primary Treatments without Alcohol 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 All-times Marijuana-Primary Treatment Ratios 
Law 0.140** 0.121* 
 0.193*** 0.155* 
(0.059) (0.072)  (0.058) (0.081) 
CA × Law    -0.289*** -0.075    (0.065) (0.093) 
CO × Law    -0.282*** -0.259***    (0.073) (0.087) 
 First-time Marijuana-Primary Treatment Ratios  
Law 0.236* 0.199***  0.273* 0.182** (0.127) (0.071)  (0.147) (0.082) 
CA × Law   
 -0.383*** -0.087 
   (0.137) (0.092) 
CO × Law   
 0.114 0.201** 
   (0.159) (0.093) 
      
Time Trends Linear Quadratic   Linear Quadratic 
Note.― All specifications include state and year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the 
state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Appendix Figure C1: Alcohol Consumption Per Capita and Alcohol-primary Treatment Ratios in 
Colorado 
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Appendix D: Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on Juveniles Aged 15–17 
In this section, I estimate the effects of laws on male juveniles aged 15–17 based on the 
TEDS data. Table D1 shows the descriptive statistics for marijuana-related and marijuana-primary 
treatment ratios among male juveniles aged 15–17. I construct the sample based on all referrals, 
including criminal justice referrals. The main reason for including criminal justice referrals is to 
compare with the results in the TEDS from Anderson et al. (2012). Also, for comparison, 
California and Colorado are included. Because some state-years have very small numbers of 
juvenile admissions, I exclude 17 state-years with total admissions of all substances less than 20. 
As a result, Delaware is not in the sample.6 As we would expect, marijuana is the most common 
abuse problem for juvenile treatment patients; nearly 80% of juvenile patients report marijuana 
abuse, and nearly 60% of them have marijuana as the primary problem. Similar to adults, 
marijuana-related treatment ratios among juveniles are significantly higher in medical marijuana 
states. However, marijuana-primary treatment ratios are not different from each other.   
Table D2 shows the estimated effects of medical marijuana laws on male juveniles aged 
15–17. The marijuana-related treatments are in the upper panel, and the marijuana-primary 
treatments are in the lower panel. In Columns (1) and (2), I use marijuana treatment rates per state 
residents as the dependent variable in order to compare with the results from Anderson, Hansen, 
and Rees (2012), in which they also conduct an analysis for teenagers using the TEDS data. The 
estimates based on treatment rates are qualitatively similar to the results from Anderson, Hansen, 
and Rees (2012); they are small or even negative with very large estimated standard errors.7  
However, population is not an appropriate denominator for substance treatments from the 
TEDS data. Because some states only collect data on publicly funded patients, the number of 
admissions fluctuates greatly in some state-years, probably due to changes in available funding. A 
large proportion of the variation in treatment rates will come from the changes in total treatment 
admissions rather than changes in marijuana treatment admissions. This explains the large 
estimated standard errors in Columns (1) and (2). In the next two columns, (3) and (4), I estimate 
6 Data in Alaska for 1998–2003 are in the sample because I can include state-years that have missing data in referral 
sources. The estimates below are not sensitive to using a larger threshold of excluding small numbers of treatment 
admissions for all substances.   
7  The model and specification here are slightly different from those in Anderson, Hansen, and Rees (2012). 
Specifically, their dependent variables are the logarithm of marijuana-related treatment gender-specific rates per 
100,000 of the population aged 15–17. Their specification includes only state linear time trends and some state-level 
control variables. They also find similar results for patients aged 18–20.         
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the effects of laws on treatment ratios of marijuana treatments to all substance treatments. The 
estimates show a 7.1–8.7% increase in the marijuana-related treatment ratio and an 11.6–11.9% 
increase in the marijuana-primary treatment ratio among male juveniles aged 15–17. The last two 
columns, (5) and (6), show the estimates separately for California and Colorado. Although they 
are still negative, most of them are not significantly different from the estimates of Lawst. Unlike 
the results for adults in the paper, the estimated effects of medical marijuana laws on male juveniles 
aged 15–17 are quite similar with or without California and Colorado.      
 Although not reported, I also find a positive effect of 10–18% on the marijuana arrest rate 
(per 100,000 city residents) and the ratio of marijuana arrests to all arrests among male juveniles 
aged 15–17 (conditional on California and Colorado). But the estimates are small and insignificant 
for the ratio of marijuana arrests to all drug arrests among male juveniles aged 15–17. However, 
the data on juvenile crime and custody rates are much less complete than the associated data for 
adults, and the juvenile justice system is very different from the adult system in areas such as its 
procedures, incentives, and sanctions (Carpenter, 2007; Levitt, 1998). In fact, although the adult 
arrest rates are much lower in medical marijuana states, the juvenile (ages 12–17) arrest rates are 
similar to non-medical marijuana states. Juvenile arrests could be largely determined by 
unobserved heterogeneities across administrative areas, and therefore the interpretation based on 
these estimates should be treated with caution. 
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Appendix Table D1: TEDS Descriptive Statistics for Male Juveniles Aged 15–17 (All 
Referrals) 
  
MJ-related 
Treatment Ratio (%)  
MJ-primary 
Treatment Ratio (%)  
State-
year 
  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Obs. 
All States                    79.25 (14.72)   58.42 (17.16)  803 
Non-MJ States                         77.96 (15.39)  58.47 (18.02)  606 
MJ States w/o CA & 
CO    83.36 (12.35)   57.23 (14.77)  163 
California  85.18 ( 3.99)  63.67 (7.97)  17 
Colorado   79.87 (8.37)    62.74 (12.13)   17 
    Note.― Medical marijuana states (MJ states) include only states that passed laws before 
July 2008; states that passed laws afterward are in non-MJ states. The sample includes both 
non-criminal justice referrals and criminal justice referrals. I exclude 17 state-years that 
have less than 20 treatment admissions for any substances. (Delaware is not in the sample.) 
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Appendix Table D2:  Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on Male Juveniles Aged 
15–17  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 MJ Treatment Rates  
(per state residents) MJ Treatment Ratios MJ Treatment Ratios  
Marijuana-related Treatment for All Referrals Aged 15–17 
Law -0.018 -0.015 0.071** 0.087* 0.087** 0.095 (0.108) (0.123) (0.031) (0.048) (0.035) (0.057) 
CA × Law     -0.133*** -0.046     (0.045) (0.060) 
CO × Law     -0.029 -0.049     (0.030) (0.053) 
Marijuana-primary Treatment for All Referrals Aged 15–17 
Law 0.026 0.017 0.116** 0.119** 0.145** 0.119** (0.119) (0.120) (0.054) (0.048) (0.058) (0.057) 
CA × Law     -0.251*** 0.057     (0.064) (0.059) 
CO × Law     -0.054 -0.044     (0.061) (0.058) 
       
Obs. 803 ( 50 States) 
Time 
Trends Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic 
    Note.― All specifications include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix E: State Level Public-Use Data from the National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health  
In Appendix E, I estimate the effects of medical marijuana laws using the state-level 
estimates of past-month marijuana use and perceived risks of marijuana from the NSDUH data 
provided by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). I 
estimate the effects from a log-linear model and compare with the results from Harper, Strumpf, 
and Kaufman (2012).  
The state-level estimates of marijuana use and perceived risks of marijuana are only 
available from 2002 and they are reported as two-year moving averages. 8  Specifically, the 
SAMHSA estimates a logistic model using two years of data together with a list of predictors such 
as racial composition, arrests for drugs and other crimes, treatment rates, and local economic 
indicators. The predicted values from the model are reported as the state-level measures of drug 
usage (Wright 2004). For example, the measure in the 2008 report is a predicted probability using 
both the 2008 and 2007 data. The NSDUH is a national representative sample, but it oversamples 
younger populations in order to obtain more precise estimates on drug use behaviors for youths.9 
The state-level estimates are separately available for three age groups that are equally sampled: 
ages 12–17, 18–25, and 26 and above. Table E1 shows the descriptive statistics of past-month 
marijuana use rates (in percentage points) and the percentage of people who perceive a great risk 
in smoking marijuana once a month for these three age groups. 10 I created two samples. In the 
upper panel of Table E1, to be consistent with the analysis in the paper, I use the 2002 state 
estimates through the 2007–2008 state estimates. [It is also the sample in the original analysis from 
Wall et al. (2011)] To compare with the results from Harper, Strumpf, and Kaufman (2012), in the 
lower panel I use the 2002–2003 estimates through the 2008–2009 estimates (they do not use the 
2002 data). In the lower panel, because Michigan passed a law in November 2008, it is counted as 
a medical marijuana state. Note that only four other states—Montana, New Mexico, Rhode Island, 
and Vermont—changed their laws during the sample period. It is clear from the table that medical 
marijuana states have higher usage rates and lower perceived risks in all age groups.  
8 For the first year available, 2002, the state-level estimates are based on only that year rather than two years. The 
state-level estimates are also available for 1999–2001; however, the SAMHSA changed the survey procedure in 2002 
and the response rates and substance prevalence rates were significantly higher than previous years. Therefore, these 
data from 1999–2001 are not comparable with later years. 
9 Except for eight large states, the number of observations in each year is 900 in the other 42 states and D.C.  
10 The survey question is: “How much do people risk harming themselves physically and in other ways when they 
smoke marijuana once a month?” 
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As in the paper, I estimate a log-linear model, with or without controlling for state-specific 
time trends, and the standard errors are clustered at the state level. I do not report the estimates for 
juveniles aged 12–17 for brevity, as they are generally very noisy and similar to Harper, Strumpf, 
and Kaufman (2012). In Table E2, I estimate the effects of medical marijuana laws on the 
marijuana use rate and perceived risks among young adults aged 18–25. In the left panel, the 
coding of medical marijuana laws is the same as the Lawst in the paper; the first year of legalization 
is coded based on the effective date. In the right panel, the first year of legalization is coded based 
on the passing date as in Harper, Strumpf, and Kaufman (2012). However, only 2004 Montana and 
2008 Michigan are changed. The results from past-month use rates are in the upper two panels. 
For past-month use rates among ages 18–25, in both samples, the estimates are not sensitive to 
alternative coding of the laws, but they are somewhat sensitive to time trend specifications. In the 
higher upper panel, the 2002 through 2007–2008 sample, the estimates show around a 5.9–9.6% 
increase in use rates without time trends or with quadratic time trends, but they are smaller and 
insignificant with linear time trends. In the lower upper panel, for the 2002–2003 through 2008–
2009 sample, the estimates without time trends are qualitatively similar to the results in Harper, 
Strumpf, and Kaufman (2012); they are positive but small and insignificant.11 On the other hand, 
the estimates show around a 5.5–7.6% increase with time trends (significant under linear trends). 
In the lower two panels, the estimates are uniformly negative based on my coding of medical 
marijuana laws, but none of the estimates are significant and the estimated standard errors are very 
large. However, the estimates based on the alternate coding from Harper, Strumpf, and Kaufman 
(2012) tend to show positive signs.  
Table E3 shows the estimates for adults aged 26 and above. For the past-month use rates, 
based on the specification with time trends and my coding of laws, the estimates are generally 
positive and show roughly a 5% increase, but they are never significant with large estimated 
standard errors. Also, these estimates are really sensitive to alternative coding and they become 
negative in the two upper right panels. There is some evidence showing a decrease in perceived 
risks for ages 26 and above, at least based on my coding. Under the specifications with time trends, 
there is a 4.0–12.0% decrease in people aged 26 and above who perceive a great risk in smoking 
11 In Appendix D, all estimates from a level specification are qualitatively similar, and I can successfully replicate the 
results from Harper, Strumpf, and Kaufman (2012).  
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marijuana once a month. However, this effect disappears when using the alternative coding of laws 
from Harper, Strumpf, and Kaufman (2012).   
In summary, the estimates suggest an increase of roughly 6% in past-month marijuana use 
for young adults aged 18–25, and there is some weak evidence showing that perceived risks 
decrease among adults. Generally speaking, these estimates are very noisy, and they are sensitive 
to different coding of laws, model specifications, and what years are covered. There are at least a 
few reasons for the lack of robustness. First, these state-level measures are two-year moving 
averages, so they are designed to reduce variations across years. Nevertheless, these fixed-effect 
estimators are identified through these yearly variations within a state. Second, these two-year 
moving averages make the first-year coding of medical marijuana laws arbitrary. Furthermore, 
these above problems are amplified due to the fact that the sample only covers a few years in which 
only a handful of states changed their laws. Therefore, these fixed-effect estimates based on these 
two-year moving averages are unreliable and should be treated with great caution.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
Appendix Table E1: Descriptive Statistics for the NSDUH State-Level Data 
 All states              Medical marijuana states  Other states   
Mean-
difference 
Tests  
 
2002 to 2007–2008, Use in Past Month (%) 
 Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  t-stat 
Age12–17 7.64  (1.63)  9.23 (1.62)  7.16 (1.29)  12.13 
Age 18–25 17.42  (4.35)  21.21 (4.40)  16.26 (3.62)    10.39 
Age 26+ 4.20 (1.17)   5.58 (0.99)  3.77 (0.86)  16.28 
 
2002 to 200–2008, Perceptions of Great Risk of Smoking Marijuana Once a Month (%) 
 Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  t-stat 
Age 12–17 33.73 (4.49)  29.42 (2.76)  35.05  (4.07)  -11.88 
Age 18-25 23.19 (4.96)  19.53  (4.67)  24.31 (4.49)  -8.45 
Age 26+ 41.00 (6.15)  35.12  (4.75)  42.81 (5.35)  -11.82 
Obs. 357   84   273     
 
2002–2003 to 2008–2009, Use in Past Month (%) 
 Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  t-stat 
Age 12–17 7.58 (1.62)  9.10 (1.53)  7.06 (1.28)  13.28 
Age 18–25 17.47 (4.39)   21.14 (4.31)   16.21 (3.66)  11.31 
Age 26+ 4.25 (1.23)  5.65 (1.07)   3.78 (0.86)   17.88 
 
2002–2003 to 2007–2008, Perceptions of Great Risk of Smoking Marijuana Once a Month (%) 
 Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  t-stat 
Age 12–17 33.58 (4.53)   29.54 (2.78)  34.96 (4.18)  -12.32 
Age 18–25 22.86  (4.94)  19.36 (4.42)  24.06 (4.51)  -9.21 
Age 26+ 40.59 (6.19)  35.06 (4.74)  42.48 (5.46)  -12.34 
Obs. 357   104   304     
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Appendix Table E2: Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on Ages 18–25 
       
Law  Law (based on Harper et al. coding) 
    
2002 to 2007–2008, Use in Past Month  
0.064** 0.028 0.096*  0.059*** 0.023 0.088* 
(0.025) (0.036) (0.053)  (0.021) (0.028) (0.048) 
       
2002–2003 to 2008–2009, Use in Past Month  
0.029 0.055* 0.065  0.027 0.062*** 0.076 
(0.038) (0.031) (0.052)  (0.036) (0.022) (0.050) 
       
2002 to 2007–2008, Perceptions of Great Risk of Smoking Marijuana Once a Month  
-0.008 -0.015 -0.095  0.004 0.014 0.0032 
(0.055) (0.097) (0.067)  (0.043) (0.064) (0.078) 
       
2002–2003 to 2008–2009, Perceptions of Great Risk of Smoking Marijuana Once a Month   
-0.026 -0.043 -0.038  -0.012 -0.006 0.024 
(0.038) (0.066) (0.073)  (0.033) (0.050) (0.086) 
       
Time Trends 
No Linear  Quadratic   No Linear  Quadratic 
    Note.― All specifications include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Appendix Table E3: Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on Ages 26+ 
       
Law  Law (based on Harper et al. coding) 
   
2002 to 2007–2008, Use in Past Month  
0.006 -0.045 0.055  -0.009 -0.066 -0.027 
(0.044) (0.051) (0.115)  (0.046) (0.046) (0.121) 
       
2002–2003 to 2008–2009, Use in Past Month  
-0.000 0.050 0.046  -0.012 0.000 -0.038 
(0.042) (0.061) (0.060)  (0.046) (0.067) (0.097) 
       
2002 to 2007–2008, Perceptions of Great Risk of Smoking Marijuana Once a Month   
-0.011 -0.049 -0.120***  0.010 0.023 -0.034 
(0.014) (0.043) (0.036)  (0.027) (0.061) (0.059) 
       
2002–2003 to 2008–2009, Perceptions of Great Risk of Smoking Marijuana Once a Month   
-0.020 -0.040** -0.084**  -0.001 0.003 -0.013 
(0.025) (0.020) (0.034)  (0.023) (0.039) (0.075) 
       
Time Trends 
No Linear  Quadratic   No Linear  Quadratic 
    Note.― All specifications include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Appendix F: Marijuana All-Drug Arrest Ratios by State (Demeaned) 
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Appendix G: Marijuana-related Treatment Ratio by State (Demeaned) 
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Appendix F: Marijuana All-Drug Arrest Ratios by State (Demeaned) 
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Appendix G: Marijuana-related Treatment Ratio by State (Demeaned) 
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